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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
This Court has requested additional briefing on the following issues: 
1. Whether or not the divergent interpretations offered by the parties of the 
language of Section 67-19-14.2(l)(b) constitutes an ambiguity requiring review of 
material beyond the plain language of the statute itself to reach a correct interpretation. 
2. Assuming, for the sake of analysis, that the language of Section 67-19-14.2 
is ambiguous: 
a. What is the impact of the statutory changes from and after 1979 on 
the question before [the Court], if any; 
b. What are the applicable principles of statutory construction, and in 
what order or priority ought they be applied; 
c. What is the import, if any, of applying theories of laches or statutes 
of limitations to takings claims arising from changes to the statute prior to 2004; 
d. In what way, if any, does the analysis applied to the 25% of banked 
sick leave hours at issue in this matter differ from that applicable to the remaining 
75%; and 
e. What was the legislative purpose behind the various changes to the 
statute after its initial enactment in 1979 and how does that bear on the proper 
interpretation of the current statutes. 
INTRODUCTION 
This supplemental brief addresses two points that are critical to resolution of this 
appeal. First, Plaintiffs' assertion that the Program has always provided the statutory 
option of exchanging the first 25% of accrued sick leave for health insurance is wholly 
unsupported by the statutory history of Section 67-19-14.2. In fact, the purported "right" 
to exchange the first 25% of accrued sick leave for health insurance did not exist until 
May 3, 2004. Prior to that time, the governing statutes provided clearly and 
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unequivocally that employees were required to cash out the first 25% of their sick leave 
hours, just as HB 213 now requires. Consequently, even if Plaintiffs could show that the 
Program gave vested contractual rights to current, non-retired employees (which they 
cannot), Plaintiffs' takings claim is, at best, limited to 25% of unused sick leave hours 
accumulated between May 3, 2004 and December 31, 2005. 
Second, and more importantly, Plaintiffs cannot even state a takings claim for that 
narrow window of time. Section 67-19-14.2(1 )(b) expressly provides that the Program 
may only be offered to an employee once the employee becomes "eligible to receive 
retirement benefits." There is no dispute that employees do not become eligible to 
receive retirement benefits until they actually retire. Section 14.2(l)(b)'s explicit 
reference to Title 49 makes this point exceedingly clear. And even if it were not clear 
from the plain language, applicable principles of statutory construction require that 
Section 14.2 be construed against the statutory creation of contractual rights. As a result, 
the plain language of the statute admits of only one plausible interpretation, and that 
interpretation is fatal to Plaintiffs' claims. The district court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Plaintiffs' Divergent "Interpretation" of Section 67-19-14.2(l)(b) is 
Implausible and Does Not Render the Statute's Plain Language Ambiguous. 
The answer to the Court's first question is straightforward and simple. "The fact 
that the parties offer differing constructions of [a] statute, in and of itself, does not mean 
that the statute is 'ambiguous.'" Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 
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791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also Epperson v. Utah State Ret Bd., 949 P.2d 779, 783 
n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (same). "[W]ords and phrases do not qualify as ambiguous 
simply because one party seeks to endow them with a different interpretation according to 
his or her own interests." Saleh v. Farmers Ins, Exck, 2006 UT 1, If 17, P.3d . For 
a statute to be ambiguous, it must be capable of '"two or more plausible meanings,'" 
Derbidge, 963 P.2d at 791 (quoting^ If v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 
1274 (Utah 1993)) (emphasis added), i.e., two or more interpretations that impart a 
reasonable degree of confidence in their credibility. See Saleh, 2006 UT 1 at j^ 16. 
Importantly, "to merit consideration as an interpretation that creates an ambiguity, the 
alternative rendition must be based upon the usual and natural meaning of the language 
used and may not be the result of a forced or strained construction." Id. at T| 17 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
In this case, the language of Section 67-19-14.2(1 )(b) is clear: 
An agency may offer the Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option Program to 
an employee who is eligible to receive retirement benefits in accordance 
with Title 49, Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2(l)(b) (2004) (emphasis added).1 The State's interpretation 
of this language is exactly as the statute reads—the Program may only be offered to an 
employee once the employee becomes eligible to receive retirement benefits. The statute 
1
 As instructed by the Court, the State's analysis focuses on Section 67-19-
14.2(l)(b), which did not exist until 2004. As explained more fully below, provisions 
regarding eligibility in prior versions of the statute are irrelevant to the question before 
the Court because Plaintiffs have no claim under any version of the statute prior to 2004. 
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does not say that the Program may be offered to any employee who is presently eligible 
"to retire," or (as Plaintiffs contend) who has accepted employment with the State. 
Rather, it plainly says that at the time of the offer, the employee must be "eligible to 
receive retirement benefits." The point at which an employee becomes eligible to receive 
retirement benefits is neither complicated nor ambiguous—it is when an employee 
actually retires. Prior to that time, even if the employee is eligible to make the decision to 
retire, he or she is still employed, not yet retired, and therefore not eligible to receive 
retirement benefits. Section 14.2(l)(b) is capable of no other plausible interpretation.2 
Even if this conclusion were not obvious from the usual and natural meaning of 
the words in Section 14.2(l)(b), it is made explicit in Title 49, which is incorporated 
therein by reference. Title 49, known as the Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit 
Act, broadly encompasses the individual retirement acts of several different 
groups, including public employees generally, public safety service employees, 
firefighters, judges, and legislators. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-12-101 to 49-19-501 
(2002 & Supp. 2005). With an exception for legislators, the statutory preconditions for 
receiving a retirement allowance or benefits are identical and unequivocal, providing that 
no public employee is qualified or eligible to receive an allowance or benefit under the 
system until three conditions are met: (a) "the member ceases actual work for a 
2
 This interpretation is so obvious that it appears almost tautologically simple. 
Even if Title 49 did not explicitly affirm this conclusion (which it does), Plaintiffs' 
assertion that an employee can receive retirement benefits while he or she is still working 
and receiving a salary defies common sense, practical reality, and the plain language of 
the statute. 
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participating employer in this system before the member's retirement date and provides 
evidence of the termination; (b) the member has submitted to the office a notarized 
retirement application form that states the member's proposed retirement date;" and (c) 
the member has accrued the necessary years of service credit.3 Id. §§ 49-12 to -18-401(1) 
(emphasis added). 
These requirements are unambiguous and make perfect sense. Retirement benefits 
are not provided simultaneously with a current employee's salary. They are only 
provided to employees once they retire. To become eligible to receive retirement 
benefits, an employee must do more than simply work long enough to become eligible to 
retire. He or she must "cease[] actual work" and submit the required paperwork. Id. 
After all, an employee who is merely eligible to retire may never do so, and thus may 
never become eligible to actually receive retirement benefits. Read in conjunction with 
the plain language of Section 14.2(l)(b), the provisions of Title 49 leave no doubt that the 
Program cannot be offered to current employees until the time of their retirement.4 
3
 The specific number of years of service credit required in order to receive 
retirement benefits varies depending on the particular retirement system; however, all of 
the retirement systems are structurally identical in that they require a member to have 
accrued a particular amount of service credit in order to be eligible to receive retirement 
benefits. Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-12 to -13-401(l)(c) (public employees), with 
§§ 49-14 to-16-401 (l)(c) (public safety service employees and firefighters), and §§ 49-17 
to-18-401(1 )(c) Gudges). 
4
 During prior oral argument, Justice Nehring raised a question whether Sections 
201 of the various acts, which deal with whether an employee " is eligible for service 
credit," change this analysis. Upon review, it is clear they do not. Those sections, which 
indicate that an employee is eligible for service credit "upon the effective date of 
employment" or upon "entering regular full-time employment," address only, for 
purposes of Sections 401(c), when an employee may begin to accumulate the required 
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As noted above, Plaintiffs' divergent "interpretation" of Section 14.2(l)(b) can 
only create an ambiguity if that interpretation is plausible and consistent with the plain 
language of the statute. Plaintiffs' interpretation, however, is entirely implausible. 
Plaintiffs contend that the Program is offered to an employee at the commencement of 
employment, and that an employee can immediately accept that offer by banking his first 
unused hour of sick leave.5 That interpretation is untethered to any language of Section 
14.2(l)(b), and it would require this Court to conclude that "an employee who is eligible 
to receive retirement benefits" refers to every employee, even those who have just begun 
employment. Such a conclusion would improperly render the actual limiting words of 
Section 14.2(l)(b) meaningless. See Foutz v. City ofS Jordan, 2004 UT 75, f 13, 100 
P.3d 1171 (noting a court is not free to construe a provision in a way that would render 
another part of it meaningless). Had the Legislature wanted to allow the Program to be 
offered to "any State employee," it could have easily so stated. Instead, it limited the 
years of qualifying employment to eventually apply for retirement. See, e.g., Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 49-12-201(1 )(a); 49-13-20l(l)(a), (2)(a). An employee is eligible to receive 
retirement benefits only when he has accumulated sufficient service credits and has 
ceased employment and filed the necessary paperwork. Thus, being eligible for service 
credits is only a subpart of being eligible to receive retirement benefits. It certainly makes 
sense that an employee should start accruing service credit towards becoming eligible to 
retire when he commences employment. But that is an entirely different question from 
when an employee becomes eligible to start receiving retirement benefits. 
5
 Plaintiffs have never made the more modest suggestion that "eligible to receive 
retirement benefits" means the same thing as "eligible to retire," though that 
interpretation is equally unavailing. Instead, they seem to base their sweeping 
interpretation on what they believe would be fair and just. Those claims, no matter how 
impassioned, cannot change the clear statutory language to the contrary. See Saleh, 2006 
UT 1 at \ 17 (an interpretation based solely on self-interest does not render a phrase 
ambiguous). 
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offer to those who are eligible to receive retirement benefits under Title 49, which 
unambiguously requires actual retirement.6 
Nor can Plaintiffs credibly claim that Section 14.2(l)(b) should be read to include 
employees who may "eventually" be eligible to receive retirement benefits (assuming, of 
course, that a host of other circumstances fall into place). Such an interpretation ignores 
the fact that the Legislature used the present tense of the verb "is" as opposed to the 
future tense "will be" to describe when an employee becomes eligible to receive 
retirement benefits. It also requires improperly reading the substantive word "eventually" 
between the words "to" and "receive". Reading substantive terms into the statute is 
inappropriate as a matter of statutory construction. See Smith v. Price Dev. Co., 2005 UT 
87, T| 23, 125 P.3d 945 (adhering to the court's "role as interpreters, not drafters, of 
legislation" in declining to "essentially . . . redraft the provision, inserting language that 
the legislature did not and removing language that the legislature selected, all to arrive at 
an interpretation that. . . says the opposite of the plain language the legislature actually 
employed"); Green River Canal Co. v. Olds, 2004 UT 106, \ 18, 110 P.3d 666 ("[I]t is 
improper to 'infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, 
6
 Plaintiffs' interpretation is also flatly inconsistent with the agency regulations 
promulgated under the statute, which make exceedingly clear that no offer or acceptance 
can be made until actual retirement. See Utah Admin. Code x All-1-6 (2005) ("Upon 
retirement from active employment, an employee may be offered a retirement benefit 
program, according to Section 67-19-14(2). . . . [and] [e]mployee participation in any part 
of this incentive program shall be voluntary, but the decision to participate shall be made 
at retirement." (emphasis added)). Where such regulations are not inconsistent with the 
statutory language, as here, they should be considered in interpreting the statute. See, 
e.g., McKnight v. State LandBd, 381 P.2d 726, 731 (Utah 1963). 
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[statutory] interpretation must be based on the language used, and the court has no power 
to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed.'" (citation omitted)). 
Plaintiffs' interpretation is contrary to the usual, natural, and common-sense 
meaning of Section 14.2(l)(b). When that Section is read together with Title 49, one can 
reach no other conclusion than that an employee is eligible to receive retirement benefits 
only when she ceases her employment and actually retires from the State. The statutory 
"offer" of the Program cannot be made before that time. Plaintiffs' contrary 
interpretation is not plausible and creates no ambiguity. As a result, this Court should 
conclude, based on the plain language of the statute, that no statutory contract can arise 
under the Program until an employee actually retires from employment with the State.7 
7
 Interpreting the statute this way is fully consistent with this Court's long line of 
cases that have addressed retirement and disability benefits and unequivocally held that an 
employee obtains no vested contractual rights in those benefits until she fulfills all 
statutory conditions precedent, i.e., she actually retires. See Driggs v. Utah State 
Teachers Ret Bd., 142 P.2d 657 (Utah 1943); Newcomb v. Ogden City Pub. Sch. 
Teachers' Ret. Comm'n, 243 P.2d 941 (Utah 1952); Hansen v. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. 
Bd. of Admin., 246 P.2d 591 (Utah 1952); Ellis v. Utah State Ret. Bd, 783 P.2d 540 (Utah 
1989). Contrary to the possibility raised by Justice Durham during oral argument, the fact 
that Plaintiffs may have foregone use of their sick leave is not a distinguishing factor 
unique to this case. In virtually every case where an employee contends a retirement 
benefit has been taken, that employee can claim to have forgone other opportunities, such 
as more lucrative employment elsewhere, in purported reliance on the alleged promise. 
Notwithstanding this forbearance, which is at least as significant as deciding not to use 
sick leave, Driggs, Newcomb, Hansen, and Ellis all unequivocally mandate that as long as 
the employee has not yet retired or become disabled, the Legislature is free to amend or 
even eliminate the statutory benefits upon which the employee claims to have 
relied—even where the employee's purported reliance has extended for ten, fifteen, or 
twenty years or more. Thus, the fact that Plaintiffs may have voluntarily chosen to forego 
using their sick leave cannot distinguish this case and remove it from the analytical 
purview of Driggs and its progeny. 
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2. The Statutory History of the Program Dramatically Limits Plaintiffs' Takings 
Claim and Nullifies Any Claim Prior to 2004. 
Assuming, for the sake of analysis, that the language of Section 97-19-14.2 were 
ambiguous, this Court has asked what impact the statutory changes made to the Program 
have on the question before it. After carefully researching the issue, the State has 
concluded that the Program's statutory changes dramatically impact that question. 
Indeed, the basis of Plaintiffs' claim—the purported statutory "promise" that the first 
25% of an employee's sick leave could be used for health insurance—did not even exist 
until 2004. Prior to that time, the statutes clearly and unambiguously required employees 
to cash out that first 25%, just like HB 213.8 
A. An Overview of the Changes to the Retirement Option Program.9 
The statutory scheme that is at issue in this appeal was first enacted in 1983.10 See 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14 (Supp. 1983).11 Under the 1983 statute, employees received 
8
 A 401(k) contribution is, in essence, the functional equivalent of a cash payout, 
particularly for employees who are eligible to withdraw from their 401(k) accounts upon 
retirement. 
9
 For the Court's convenience, copies of the statutes described herein are included 
in Appellee's Addendum at tabs "A" through "J". 
10
 Prior to 1983, the Legislature had enacted two statutes governing the use of 
converted sick leave. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-13-14.1 (Supp. 1975); id. § 67-19-14 
(Supp. 1979). Neither of these statutes is relevant for purposes of this analysis, however, 
because they involve the history of the current Section 14.1. Only Section 14.2 is at issue 
in this appeal. See Appellants' Brief at 38; Appellants' Docketing Statement. 
11
 In 1983, the Legislature actually passed four separate amendments to the statute. 
The first two of these amendments were in effect for only three months and required, 
among other things, a set percentage of accumulated sick leave be converted to cash at 
retirement in graduated amounts, depending on the employee's age at retirement. See 
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two benefits. First, employees received automatic health and life insurance until either 
the employee reached age sixty-five or for five years, whichever was less. See id. § 67-
19-14(2)(b). More importantly, employees received the ability to use some accumulated 
unused sick leave to purchase continued health insurance benefits at the ratio of one 
month of coverage for each day of unused sick leave. Id. The use of accumulated unused 
sick leave under this program, however, was expressly restricted. Specifically, the 
Legislature mandated that, prior to using any accumulated unused sick leave to purchase 
health and life insurance, "[t]he program shall provide for an employee to be paid for 
25% of unused accumulated sick leave at the employee's preretirement rate of pay." Id. 
(emphasis added). Only the remaining 75% of accumulated unused sick leave was 
available to purchase continued health insurance with any unused sick leave in excess of 
sixty days, and only then until the employee reached age of sixty-five. Id. at § 67-19-
14(2)(c). 
Thus, from the Program's very inception, an employee was required to take the 
first 25% of his unused accumulated sick leave in cash (a requirement which, as described 
below, remained in place until 2004). The Court will no doubt recognize that, except for 
requiring a 401(k) contribution instead of a cash payment, these are substantively the 
same requirements imposed by HB 213. 
Over the next decade, the Legislature made several amendments to the statute that 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14 (Interim Supp. 1983). The third amendment was superseded 
before going into effect. See Senate Bill 4, 1983. The provisions described in the text 
above are those contained in the fourth and final amendment. 
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are not particularly relevant to this appeal.12 In 1998, the Legislature modified the 
Program to allow employees the choice between receiving the 25% payout in cash or 
having the amount transferred directly to a 401(k) account. See id. § 67-19-14(2)(b)(i) 
(Supp. 1998). Importantly, however, an employee was still not permitted to use any of 
the first 25% of her accumulated sick leave to purchase post-retirement benefits. See id. § 
67-19-14(2)(b)(i)(A) (maintaining the provision that "[t]he program shall provide for an 
employee to be paid for 25% of unused accumulated sick leave . . . .").13 At the same 
time, the Legislature also modified the Program in order to allow employees to use their 
accumulated unused sick leave to purchase health insurance beyond the age of sixty-five 
(i.e., Medicare supplemental insurance), so that older employees who retired with a 
significant number of accumulated unused sick leave hours would no longer lose those 
12
 See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14(c) (Supp. 1989) (adding provisions with respect 
to the surviving spouse and family of any state employee whose death occurred in the line 
of duty); id. § 67-19-14(2) (Supp. 1993) (making minor formatting changes and replacing 
the age sixty-five requirement with the phrase "becomes eligible for Medicare"). 
13
 The State acknowledges that, since 1999, Department of Human Resource 
Management (DHRM) regulations appear to be inconsistent with this clear statutory 
language by providing an option to use the first 25% of an employee's accrued sick leave 
for health insurance, rather than requiring a cash-out or 401(k) contribution, as the statute 
requires. However, "[i]t is a long-standing principle of administrative law that an 
agency's rules must be consistent with its governing statutes," and that any rule "that is 
out of harmony with a governing statute is invalid." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. State Tax 
Comm % 846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1993); see also Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., 762 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("Administrative regulations 'may not 
conflict with the design of an Act, and when they do the court has a duty to invalidate 
them.'" (citation omitted)). Plaintiffs concede as much in their opening brief, noting that 
"after all, an agency must always act within its statutory parameters." Appellants' Brief at 
18. Because these regulations are clearly contrary to the express language of the 
governing statute, they were beyond the authority of DHRM to promulgate, legally void, 
and cannot create an enforceable contract. 
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hours after reaching age sixty-five. See id. § 67-19-14(2)(c).14 
It was not until the Legislature amended the statute again in 2004—more than two 
decades after the Program was first enacted and during which time Plaintiffs argue they 
were accepting the Program's statutory "offer" by banking their unused sick leave 
hours—that the Legislature first gave employees the statutory ability to use the first 25% 
of their unused sick leave for health insurance instead of receiving cash or a 401(k) 
contribution. See id. § 67-19-14.2(2) (2004) (allowing employees to be paid "for up to 
25% of the employee's unused accumulated sick leave" and use any remainder to 
purchase continuing medical and life insurance benefits (emphasis added)).15 Prior to that 
time, the statutory "right" that Plaintiffs claim was taken by HB 213 simply did not exist. 
B. The Program's Statutory History Dramatically Limits Plaintiffs' 
Claims. 
The Program's statutory history undermines the viability of Plaintiffs' claims. 
Plaintiffs' takings argument is based on the assertion that HB 213 unconstitutionally takes 
their right to use the first 25% of their accrued sick leave for health insurance. See 
Appellants' Brief at 16. They claim they had been promised that right for more than 
14
 The following year, the Legislature made another minor revision to the Program, 
which again is not relevant to this appeal. See id. § 67-19-14(2)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1999) 
(clarifying that health and insurance benefits must be the same benefits the employee had 
at retirement). 
15
 This amendment, which became effective May 3, 2004, also split the existing 
Section 67-19-14 into four independently numbered sections, clarified the language in 67-
19-14.2(l)(b) that an agency may not offer the Program until the employee becomes 
eligible to receive retirement benefits, and made other substantive and stylistic changes 
that are not relevant for purposes of this appeal. See id. § 67-19-14 to -14.3. 
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"twenty years" and relied on that promise by banking thousands of hours of sick leave. 
See id. at 15-16. And they seek to invalidate HB 213 based on the assertion that the bill 
changes the statutory promises made as far back as 1979. See id. at 7. 
The statutory history of the Program tells a very different story. For more than 
twenty years, the purported "right" to use the first 25% of a retiring employee's sick leave 
for health insurance did not exist. Indeed, since its inception in 1983, the Program 
expressly required that this amount be paid to the employee in cash. In 1998, employees 
were given the option to take this 25% either as cash or as a 401(k) contribution, but no 
provision was made allowing that portion to be used for health insurance. It was not until 
2004 that the statute was amended to provide the statutory option that Plaintiffs claim was 
"taken" by HB 213. 
For all of the reasons articulated in Section 1, supra, and in the State's prior brief, 
Plaintiffs would not have a valid takings claim even if the statute had been the same in 
1983 as it was in 2004. The language used in the 2004 statute does not create any 
contractual rights in current State employees because any rights created by the 2004 
statute only inure when an employee actually retires. However, even if the Court were to 
assume that Plaintiffs were entirely correct in their analysis, and that HB 213 changed the 
2004 version of the Program in an unconstitutional manner, Plaintiffs claims are still 
severely more limited than they have argued before this Court. According to Plaintiffs, a 
contract was formed between the State and its employees whenever those employees 
banked their sick leave in reliance on the provisions of the Program. See, e.g., 
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Appellants' Brief at 18 (employees "accepted] the offer, and thus the promise of future 
reward, by continuing their employment and banking their sick leave instead of using it as 
it accrue[d]"). However, an employee who banked sick leave hours in 1985, for instance, 
could have no expectation that the first 25% of those hours could be used for health 
insurance because the statute required that those hours be cashed out. The same is true 
for an employee in 1990, 1998, and even 2003. It was not until the 2004 amendments 
became effective on May 3, 2004, that any employee could argue he was accepting a 
"contract" that allowed the full amount of accrued sick leave to be exchanged for health 
insurance. Similarly, there is no dispute that any such statutory offer contained in the 
2004 version ended on January 1, 2006, the effective date of the Program II provisions of 
HB213. 
Because at all times prior to May 3, 2004, Plaintiffs had no contractual expectation 
to purchase continued health insurance with the first 25% of their accumulated unused 
sick leave, they cannot argue HB 213 constituted a taking with respect to unused sick 
leave hours earned and accumulated prior to that time. Assuming, as the Court has 
requested, an ambiguity in the statute, the only contractual "right" that HB 213 possibly 
could have taken would be limited to sick leave Plaintiffs banked during the brief one and 
a half year period during which that statutory option was in effect. Consequently, even if 
Plaintiffs could demonstrate that the elimination of the health insurance option for the 
first 25% of an employee's sick leave constitutes a taking as to current employees, that 
claim is, at best, based solely on hours accrued between May 3, 2004 and December 31, 
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2005.16 
3. Assuming the Statute is Ambiguous, the Relevant Principles of Statutory 
Construction Compel the Conclusion That the Program Does Not Create a 
Contract with Non-Retired Employees. 
In a normal case and under standard canons of construction, this Court might 
arguably be able to construe a statutory ambiguity in Plaintiffs' favor. However, this is 
not a normal case. Plaintiffs are asking this Court to construe a statute in a way that 
creates contractual obligations for the State. Under such circumstances, a fundamental 
and more restrictive principle of statutory construction applies mandating that, if the 
statute is ambiguous, Plaintiffs cannot prevail. 
In order to conclude that a state legislative enactment gives rise to a contract, there 
must first be a clear and unequivocal indication that the legislature intended to bind itself 
in a contractual manner. This is because when a court interprets a statute for purposes of 
determining whether that statute gives rise to a binding contract against the State, the 
"well-established presumption" is that "absent some clear indication that the legislature 
intends to bind itself contractually,. . . ca law is not intended to create private contractual 
16
 Incidentally, given this limitation, there is a significant question whether the 
alleged taking is substantial enough to be cognizable. The maximum number of hours 
Plaintiffs could have banked between May 3, 2004 and December 31, 2005 is 180. 
Plaintiffs' takings claim is confined to the effect on 25% of those hours, i.e., a maximum 
of 45 hours, or five-months of health insurance. At Plaintiffs' calculated rates, that 
amounts to approximately $3,800, which must be further offset by: (1) the value of the 
401(k) contribution provided; (2) the value of avoiding tax liability for constructive 
receipt, including all withholdings, which could further diminish the number of hours 
available for health insurance; and (3) the cost-of-living salary increase and other benefits 
specifically provided in the 2005 Supplemental Appropriations Act to offset HB 213. 
165784v1 15 
or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature shall 
ordain otherwise.'" Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465-66 (1985) (citation omitted). 
The rationale behind this presumption is obvious. The principal function of a 
legislature is to establish the policy of the state, not make contracts that would bind future 
legislatures. See id. Consequently, to construe a law as a contract "'when the obligation 
is not clearly and unequivocally expressed would be to limit drastically the essential 
powers of a legislative body," id., and c"play[] havoc with basic principles of contract 
law, traditional contract clause analysis, and, most importantly, the fundamental 
legislative prerogative to reserve to itself the implicit power of statutory amendment and 
modification.'" Retired Adjunct Professors of the State ofR.L v. Almond, 690 A.2d 1342, 
1346 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 808 (Conn. 1985)). As 
one court accurately observed, "c[t]o treat statutes as contracts would enormously curtail 
the operation of democratic government. Statutes would be ratchets, creating rights that 
could never be retracted or even modified without buying off the groups upon which the 
rights had been conferred.'" Proska v. Ariz. State Schools for the Deaf and the Blind, 74 
P.3d 939, 941 (Ariz. 2003) (quoting Pittman v. Chicago Bd ofEduc, 64 F.3d 1098, 1104 
(7th Cir. 1995)). 
Therefore, because interpreting a statute to create a contract considerably 
constrains the freedom of subsequent legislatures to make amendments to that statute, 
there is necessarily "a higher burden to establish that a contractual obligation has been 
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created." Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R.L Employees' Ret. Sys.9 173 F.3d 46, 60 (1st Cir. 
1999). This fundamental principle of statutory construction has been widely accepted and 
consistently applied by numerous courts facing facts strikingly similar to this case.17 
The result of this presumption is fatal to Plaintiffs' claims. It is not enough for 
Plaintiffs to offer a divergent interpretation of the statute and hope the ambiguity may be 
construed in their favor. Because of the fundamental and inherent statutory presumption 
in this case, Plaintiffs must establish that the statute is clear and unequivocal in their 
favor. However, because the question presented by the Court assumes the existence of an 
ambiguity, and thus an unclear legislative intent, the canon of construction against 
construing statutes to create contracts requires that any ambiguity here be construed 
against creating the contract Plaintiffs seek. 
17
 This is true not only as a general matter, see, e.g., Pick v. Nelson, 528 N.W.2d 
309, 319-20 (Neb. 1995); Peterson v. Humphrey, 381 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986), but particularly where courts have been called upon to determine whether a statute 
gives rise to a binding contractual obligation in a public employment setting, see, e.g., 
Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1997) (no clear statutory intent to create 
contractual retirement obligations either when employees accept employment or become 
eligible to retire, but rather, only upon actual retirement); Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 
515-517 (Me. 1993) (no clear statutory intent to create contractual retirement obligations 
upon acceptance of employment); Studierv. Mich. Pub. Sch. Employees' Ret. Bd., 698 
N.W.2d 350, 360-65 (Mich. 2005) (no clear statutory intent to create contractual health 
care benefits); State ex rel Horvath v. State Teachers Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644, 653-55 
(Ohio 1998) (no clear statutory intent to create contractual obligation to pay interest on 
retirement contributions); Proska v. Ariz. State Sch. for the Deaf& Blind, 74 P.3d 939, 
941-42 (Ariz. 2003) (no clear statutory intent to create contractual employment rights); 
Chotkowski v. State, 690 A.2d 368, 379-80 (Conn. 1997) (same); Fumarolo Chicago Bd. 
ofEduc, 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1304-06 (111. 1990) (same); cf Alston v. City of Camden, 471 
S.E.2d 174, 177-79 (S.C. 1996) (no clear intent in ordinance to create contractual 
employment rights); Dunn v. Milwaukee County, 2005 WI App 27, ffif 7-21, 693 N.W.2d 
82 (same). 
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Even if this Court were to examine whether the statute clearly and unequivocally 
expressed a contractual intent, it would be compelled to reach the same result. To 
determine whether a legislature has clearly and unequivocally intended to bind itself 
contractually, the Court need look only to the plain language of the statute itself. See 
Studierv. Mich. Pub. Sch. Employees'Ret. Bd, 698 N.W.2d 350, 362 (Mich. 2005); 
Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 14-28 (1st Cir. 1997). In determining whether this 
language evinces a clear contractual intent, this Court must apply the standard canons of 
statutory construction with respect to the interpretation of the plain language, i.e., assume 
that each term was used advisedly and read the words literally unless such a reading 
would be unreasonably confusing or inoperable, John Holmes Constr. v. R.A. McKell 
Excavating, 2005 UT 83, ^  12, P.3d , as well as "read the plain language of the 
statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same 
chapter and related chapters." Mt. Ranch Estates v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2004 UT 
86, U 11, 100 P.3d 1206 (internal quotations omitted). Importantly, this Court must 
"adhere to [its] role as interpreters, not drafters, of legislation," Smith v. Price Dev. Co., 
2005 UT 87, Tl 23, 125 P.3d 945, and refuse to infer substantive terms into the text that 
are not already there in order to avoid effectively rewriting the statute to conform to an 
intention not expressed. See Green River Canal Co. v. Olds, 2004 UT 106, ^ 18, 110 
P.3d 666. 
For all the reasons described above, the plain language of Section 14.2 does not 
evince a clear and unequivocal intent to create a contract between every current employee 
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simply because those employees may one day be eligible to receive retirement benefits. 
On the contrary, the plain language of the statute says just the opposite. Any other 
interpretation would, in fact, fail to give meaning to substantive terms in the statute as 
well as ignore more than twenty years of statutory history. 
Additionally, there is no language in Section 14.2 expressly articulating that the 
benefits provided therein will not be subject to legislative change prior to an employee's 
retirement. Without such a statement, courts have been extremely reluctant to infer a 
binding contractual obligation. See Nat 7 Educ. Ass 'n of R.I v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. 
Employees'Ret Sys., 172 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Parker, 123 F.3d at 5-6). If 
the Legislature had intended for the statute to authorize a contract or to extend contractual 
benefits to current employees, it would have been easy enough for it to have simply and 
unmistakably said so. The fact that the Legislature did not strongly indicates that it had 
no such intention. See id. 
Because the plain language of the statute does not demonstrate a clear and 
unequivocal intent to create a contract with respect to current employees, there is no need 
to examine secondary evidence such as legislative history and policy arguments. See 
Studier, 698 N.W.2d at 364 (noting that it "need not [look to secondary evidence] because 
of the absence of clear and unequivocal language showing an intent to contract"); 
Parker, 123 F.3d at 9 (declining to give weight to evidence indicating that some 
legislators wanted to protect vested rights because the statutory language itself was 
ambiguous). Nevertheless, no secondary evidence undermines this conclusion. 
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Turning to the purpose of the statute, there is little evidence to affirmatively 
indicate the specific reasons why each Legislature enacted or continued to modify the 
Program over the course of the past two decades. Unfortunately, review of the floor 
hearings and committee debates provide no relevant insight as to the collective judgment 
of the Legislature as a whole. Purposes may have varied over time, or from legislator to 
legislator. The Legislature may have desired to provide employees with an incentive to 
retire early, for example, or to provide an added incentive for reducing sick leave abuse.18 
It may have also wanted to induce employees to continue working for the State, or to 
simply reward retiring employees in appreciation for their services to the public. 
Inducements for employment are nothing new in the public or private sector, and it goes 
without saying that many inducements are far from contractual guarantees. The 
Legislature may have intended to enact the Program for all of these reasons, or for none 
of them at all. Given the nature of the secondary resources available, the precise reasons 
for the Legislature's actions over the last two decades are at best speculative and subject 
to conjecture. 
If this Court were to undertake the speculative task of trying to divine what each 
Legislature might have intended in passing the various iterations of the Program, only one 
18
 It is worth noting that the purpose of reducing sick leave abuse is quite different 
and much more limited than the purpose of reducing the legitimate use of sick leave. The 
State has a clear interest in ensuring that sick leave is used for the purposes it is offered, 
i.e., when an employee or family member is actually sick. The purpose of the Program 
has never been to facilitate what some of the Plaintiffs have admitted to doing—coming 
to work sick and avoiding any use of sick leave so that they could compile years of free 
health insurance upon retirement. 
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conclusion seems clear: regardless of its specific affirmative purposes, the Legislature 
would not have intended to render itself powerless to modify the terms of the Program, 
particularly where doing so would irrevocably commit the State to pay ever-increasing 
and unpredictable health care costs. In terms of public policy, there are compelling 
reasons for declining to interpret the statute in such a restrictive manner. 
First, such an interpretation could have an immediate impact not only on current 
and future employees, but on the public at large. If agencies were forced to tie up even 
larger portions of their limited resources to fund retirement benefits, they may have no 
choice but to cut needed public programs and services, or to forego giving current 
employees the raises they both need and deserve. Agencies may also choose to simply cut 
their losses by withdrawing participation from the Program altogether, sacrificing their 
employees' ability to earn Program II hours in order to offset the additional expense of 
Program I hours. In other words, the needs of current and future employees may be 
sacrificed to subsidize the spiraling expense of post-retirement benefits.19 
Additionally, interpreting the statute as creating a vested right in unused sick leave 
prior to retirement could have far ranging and unintended consequences for the entire 
public employment system. Employees who leave State employment prior to retirement 
may begin demanding compensation for accrued sick leave based on a judicially created 
19
 Moreover, as extensively demonstrated in the State's opening brief, HB 213 is, 
in fact, beneficial to certain subclasses of State employees, such as those who plan to 
retire after the age of sixty. How to balance the competing concerns of different classes 
of State employees, and the needs of current and future employees, against those already 
retired is a task best suited to the policy discretion of the Legislature, not the courts. 
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right—compensation for which there is no statutory entitlement. See Utah Admin. Code 
r.477-7-4(8) (2005). Such a result could create a new, unfunded liability for the State. 
Finally, interpreting the statute in a way that would allow one Legislature to 
effectively bind the hands of future legislatures could have even broader consequences 
that could unintentionally result in fewer retirement benefits for State employees as a 
whole. As this Court wisely observed in Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System 
Board of Administration, 246 P.2d 591 (Utah 1952): 
If the legislature could bind the State absolutely and irrevocably to any 
pension [or retirement benefit] plan it should offer until the last employee 
performing any service under it had retired and died, it would definitely 
tend to discourage the creation of [such] systems. . . . Such a view of the 
law as advocated by plaintiffs might, instead of improving the lot of 
employees who should be protected by pensions or retirement systems in 
their old age, in fact ultimately defeat the very purpose of the pension 
systems by making them impractical. The need for a reasonable degree of 
flexibility, permitting reforms, reorganizations and the utilization of 
advances in knowledge and experience, appears to us to be an important 
consideration in legislation dealing with retirement and old age insurance 
systems. 
Id. at 596. If the Legislature is concerned that offering any employment incentive or 
benefit will forever bind the State, it may very well opt to severely limit or simply forego 
providing them altogether. See Proska, 74 P.3d at 941 ("If statutes were routinely treated 
as establishing contractual rights, the legislature might well be discouraged from 
addressing pressing public needs, for fear that any law could not thereafter be modified 
without the consent of those for whose benefit it was passed."). Thus, while interpreting 
the Program in the way Plaintiffs advocate may provide a short-term benefit to Plaintiffs, 
it may ultimately result in a long-term detriment to State employees as a whole. 
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In short, if the statute were ambiguous, as this Court has asked the State to assume, 
then the Legislature did not clearly and unequivocally express an intent to enter into a 
contract with non-retired employees. Applicable principles of statutory construction 
require that, under such circumstances, Plaintiffs' claims must fail. 
4. There is No Import to Theories of Laches or Statutes of Limitation. 
As noted above, Plaintiffs have no takings claim based on any statutory change 
prior to 2004 because the "right" they claim was taken did not exist until the 2004 
amendment. Thus, the short answer to the Court's question is that there is no import to 
theories of laches or statute of limitations for takings claims prior to 2004 because 
Plaintiffs have no such claims. 
Even if Plaintiffs could state a takings claim on any statutory amendments prior to 
2004, Plaintiffs could not challenge any such amendment. In a facial challenge, the only 
question before the court is whether the mere enactment of the statute at issue constitutes 
a taking. See Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy Hills, Inc., 958 P.2d 245, 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 3n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493 (1987) 
(addressing facial challenge to enactment of a statute as a taking)). In this context, "the 
basis of a facial challenge is that the very enactment of the statute has reduced the value 
of the property or has effected a transfer of a property interest. This is a single harm, 
measurable and compensable when the statute is passed." See Natl Ass yn of Home 
Builders of the United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. 96-55274, 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 
13877, *4-6 (9th Cir. June 9, 1997) (unpublished opinion); see also Waltower v. Kaiser, 
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17 Fed. Appx. 738, 741 (10th Cir. 2001) (cause of action accrues when all events 
necessary to state claim have occurred; in facial challenges, all events necessary to state 
claim occurred when challenged statute became effective). Consequently, the applicable 
statute of limitations begins to run at the time the statute is enacted. 
Here, as Plaintiffs have couched their claims, any interest Plaintiffs have in their 
accumulated unused sick leave is, at best, an interest in personal property. Thus, the 
applicable statute of limitations would be the three-year statute of limitations "for taking, 
detaining, or injuring personal property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-16 (2002). Because 
the last amendment to the precedessor of Section 14.2 occurred in 1999, any challenges to 
that statute or prior amendments would be time-barred. As a result, and because Plaintiffs 
have no substantive takings claim prior to 2004 in any event, issues of laches and statutes 
of limitation are irrelevant. 
5. There is No Relevant Difference in the Analysis Regarding the First 25% of 
Sick Leave as Opposed to the Remaining 75%. 
The Court has asked whether the State's analysis would differ when applied to the 
remaining 75% of sick leave, rather than the first 25% at issue in Plaintiffs' claims. 
Because Section 14.2 cannot create a contract with any current employee until the time of 
retirement, there is no meaningful difference in this analysis. Options regarding the last 
75% of sick leave are still part of the Program, and are thus governed by the terms on 
which that Program may be offered to eligible employees. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-
14.2(l)(b), -(2)(c), and -(4) (2004). Employees are not eligible to be offered the Program 
until they cease actual work. Prior to actual retirement, therefore, current employees have 
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no vested right to exchange the last 75% of their sick leave for health insurance, just as 
they have no such right with respect to the first 25%. The analysis is the same. 
Assuming, arguendo, that (1) Plaintiffs did have vested contractual rights in the 
options provided by the Program, and (2) HB 213 did alter their right to use 75% of their 
unused sick leave, Plaintiffs might have a takings claim based on sick leave hours banked 
prior to 2004. But of course, HB 213 did not alter an employee's options with respect to 
this remaining 75%, and such hypothetical facts are not before this Court. 
6. Issues of Legislative Purpose are Addressed Above. 
The Court's final question addresses the legislative purpose behind the various 
changes to the statute after 1979. The State has addressed this question at length in 
Section 3, supra, and will not duplicate it here. Suffice it to say that any inquiry into 
legislative purpose, particularly the purpose of legislatures that convened twenty-five 
years ago, is a speculative endeavor. It is also unnecessary in this case given the clear and 
express language of Section 14.2 and the manifest implausibility of Plaintiffs' 
interpretation of that statute. 
If the frequency with which the Legislature changed the Program over the years 
reveals anything, it is that the Legislature did not intend to create an immutable statutory 
scheme that would be forever "fossilized in legislative amber." Retired Adjunct 
Professors, 690 A.2d at 1345. The passage of HB 213 was a recognition of this fact, and 
a necessary exercise of the Legislature's policy-making function to avoid committing the 
State to escalating and unpredictable levels of debt. There is nothing in the statutory 
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history of the Program that supports Plaintiffs' claims, no plausible ambiguity in Section 
14.2 that changes the plain meaning of its terms, and no justification for judicially 
curtailing the proper exercise of the Legislature's role in amending its laws. 
Plaintiffs' appeal should be denied. 
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vided the act should take effect upon ap-
proval. Approved February 14, 1973. 
!KIT SYSTEMS 
sions—Schedules oi* civil service—Alloca-
tnge schedule assignment—-"Merit system" 
sd. 
etc. 
MERIT SYSTEMS 67-13-6 
67-13-4-1- Incentive to reduce sick leave abuse.—As an incentive to 
duce sick leave abuse, those rules and regulations for personnel admin-
• tration promulgated pursuant to section 67-13-4 shall include procedures 
hereby, after an employee has accumulated eighteen unused sick leave 
A vs any sick leave days accumulated during any calendar year in excess 
f
 ei*ht, at the option of that employee, may be converted to his sched-
led vacation period the following year or at the time of retirement may be 
nverted into paid-up health and medical insurance on the basis of the 
avment by the employing department of one month's premium for each 
iaV of accumulated sick leave to a supplemental program developed by 
the Utah state retirement board. 
History: C. 1953, 67-13-4.1, enacted by 
L. 1975, ch. 201, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act enacting section 67-13-4.1, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953; relating to rules 
and regulations for personnel; providing 
that those rules and regulations shall in-
clude provisions establishing an incentive 
to reduce sick leave abuse; providing the 
manner in which that incentive shall op-
era te ; and providing an effective date.— 
Laws 1975, ch. 201. 
Effective Date. 
Section 2 of Laws 1975, ch. 201 pro-
vided: "This act shall take effect July 1, 
1&75." 
67-13-6. Positions exempt from merit provisions—Schedules of civil 
service—Allocation of positions—Requests to change schedule assignment 
—"Merit system" and "classified civil service" defined.—(a) Except as 
otherwise provided by law or by rules and regulations promulgated here-
under for federally aided programs, the following positions shall be exempt 
from the merit provisions of this act : 
(1) to (7) * * * [Same as parent volume.] 
(8) Teaching staffs of all state institutions, and patients and inmates 
employed in state institutions. 
(9) Persons employed in a professional or scientific capacity to make 
or conduct a temporary and special inquiry, investigation, or examination 
on behalf of the legislature or committee thereof or by authority of the 
governor or a department. 
(10) Noncareer employees compensated for their services on a seasonal 
or contractual basis who are hired for limited periods of less than nine 
consecutive months, or who are employed on less than one-half time basis. 
(b) to(e) [Same as parent volume.] 
(f) The term "classified civil service" shall refer to positions (merit or 
exempt) in the executive departments below the level of department or 
agency head (excluding institutions of higher learning, part-time consul-
tants, and attorneys employed by the office of the attorney general). 
(g) All employees of the office of secretary of state, the office of state 
auditor, the office of state treasurer, the office of attorney general (excluding 
attorneys), and employees of the judiciary who are not exempt by the 
provisions of this section shall be covered by the provisions of the merit 
system. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 131, S 5; 1971, 
ch.183, §1 ; i 9 7 3 ) c h . 1 8 5 > § 1 0 . 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1971 amendment deleted reference 




ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "B" 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14 (Supp. 1979) 
ID EMPLOYEES 
II be weighted to remove any bias 
r may cooperate with other public 
arvey. The results of this survey 
mended revisions to the pay
 plan* 
the year in which the survey j§ 
5 shall include consideration of 
achieve reasonable comparability 
or occupational areas in private 
parable private positions in Utah 
1
 cost of living adjustments in 
shall recommend the method of 
according to this section. The 
nded revisions due to the salary 
formance increases and incentive 
endations made by the governor 
ons to the pay plan and selective 
by schedules indicating cost by 
ource of funds. 
ted by the legislature shall take 
^raft positions shall be developed 
1 be determined by taking the 
within the community without 
' shall develop and issue criteria 
ie, craft, and related positions 
1 consist of similar occupations 
er, shall be adjusted to reflect 
ting conditions and tenure be-
itry. The same provisions that 
cost of living adjustments and 
1 craft plan The provisions of 
* waiting periods for in-grade 
n. The director shall establish 
and grade increases that will 
ie steps of apprentice, journey-
certification of employee eligi-
^rsonnel management may ex-
formity with this chapter and 
position covered by this chap-
, title or status, nor shall any 
STATE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT 6749-15 
employee be paid unless certified by the director as eligible under the 
provisions of or regulations promulgated pursuant to this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-13, enacted "by I*. 
1979, ch. 139, § 19. 
67-19-14. Sick leave rules and regulations—Conversion of accumulated 
sick leave.—The director of personnel management shall, as an incentive 
to reduce sick leave abuse, promulgate rules and regulations governing 
procedures whereby, after an employee has accumulated 18 unused sick 
leave days, any sick leave days accumulated during any calendar year in 
excess of eight, at the option of that employee, may be converted to the 
employee's scheduled vacation period the following year or at the time of 
retirement may be converted into paid-up health and medical insurance 
on the basis of the payment by the employing department of one month's 
premium for each day of accumulated sick leave to a supplemental program 
developed by the Utah state retirement board. 
History: 0. 1953, 67-19-14, enacted by I*. 
1979, ch. 139, § 20. 
67-19-15. Career service—Exempt positions—Schedules for civil service 
positions—Tenure—Coverage of career service provisions.—(1) Except as 
otherwise provided by law or by rules and regulations promulgated here-
under for federally aided programs, the following positions shall be exempt 
from the career service provisions of this act : 
' (a) The governor, members of the legislature, and all other elected 
state officers ; 
(b) Persons appointed to fill vacancies in elective positions, employees 
of the state legislature, employees of the state judiciary, members of boards 
and commissions, and heads of departments appointed by the governor, 
state and local officials serving ex officio, and members of state and local 
boards and councils appointed by the governing bodies of the departments; 
-t, (c) All employees and officers in the office and at the residence of the 
governor; 
(d) Those employees who make final policy decisions, including all 
heads of departments, agencies and major offices; those heads of subordinate 
units,whose duties have a direct and substantial effect on the public rela-
tions of state administration generally; those employees whose regular 
duties include public advocacy and defense of administration policy; and 
ftose in a personal and confidential relationship to elected officials and to 
hgads of departments, agencies and other major offices. All positions 
$|signated as being exempt pursuant to this subsection shall be listed in 
% rules and regulations promulgated under this act by the job title and 
department or agency and any change in exempt status shall constitute an 
*Mtendment to the rules and regulations; 
^;(e) Unskilled employees in positions requiring little or no specialized 
flavor .training. A roster of all such positions showing job title, number 




ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "C" 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14 (Interim Supp. 1983) (effective May 10, 1983) 
19-14 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
ure between state employment and private industry. The same provisions that 
)ly to the classified pay plan regarding labor market change adjustments and 
ary surveys shall apply to the trade and craft plan. The provisions of subsection 
[c) of this section regarding waiting periods for in-grade salary increases shall 
apply to this plan. The director shall establish standards and requirements 
arding step and grade increases that will establish a reasonable progression 
ough the steps of apprentice, journeyman and master. 
5) The director shall regularly evaluate the total compensation program of 
be employees in the classified service. Total compensation shall include but not 
limited to salaries and wages, bonuses, paid leave, job security, group insurance 
is, retirement and all other fringe benefits that are or may be offered to state 
>loyees as inducements to work for the state. A survey of benefits shall be con-
ted by PPM yearly to provide this information. The survey shall be a cross sec^ 
[ 9i th§ various types and sizes of employers throughout the state and the 
jjts shah be weighted to remove any bias caused by uneven responses. 
I) The director shall submit proposals for a total compensation plan to the gov-
>r by October 30 of each year, setting forth findings and recommendations 
cting state employee compensation which the governor shall consider in the 
>aration of budget recommendations to the legislature. The governor's budget 
wsals shall include a specific recommendation on state employee compensation 
e acted upon by the legislature. 
istory: U.C.A.; L. 1983, ch. 332, § 5. 
-19-14. (1) The director of personnel management shall, as an incentive to 
ice sick leave abuse, promulgate rules and regulations governing procedures 
reby, after an employee has accumulated 18 unused sick leave days, any sick 
e days accumulated during any calendar year in excess of eight, at the option 
hat employee, may be converted to the employee's scheduled vacation period 
following year or at the time of retirement may fee converted into pm4-up 
tit ano mcuicai insurance on tne oasis or tne payment x)y tnc employing ucpart-
fe of one month's premium for eaeh flay -of accumulated -gkk 4eave -to -a -flttfrple-
fcat program developed fey the Utah state retirement board carried as 
verted sick leave*' which the employee may use at a later date as annual leave, 
lar sick leave, or as paid up health and medical insurance at the time of retire-
t 22 ik§ basis of the payment by the employing department of cme month's 
tium for each day of accumulated sick leave. 
At the time of retirement, any employee of the state may be paid for accu,-
ted, unused sick leave with payment based on the employee's rate of pay at 
ime of retirement Any agreement must be voluntarily entered into by both 
tffected employee and the employing department. The department must pay 
smployee the monies owed under the provisions of this bill within the Jfiscal 
of his/her retirement. If the employee retires before age 65, the accumulated, 
?d sick leave shall bg converted according to the following schedule: 
Prior tOj or at age 60^  50% of accumulated unused sick leave shall be con: 
d to a cash payment; 
At age 61, 45% of accumulated unused sick leave shall be converted to a 
payment; 
At age 62, 40% of accumulated unused sick leave shall be converted to j * 
payment; 
At age 63, 35% of accumulated unused sick leave shall be converted to a 
3ayment; 
At age 64, 30% of accumulated unused sick leave shall be converted to j * 
>ayment; and 
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(£L_At age 65, or thereafter, 25% of ace 
ygrted to a cash payment. A maximum of I 
daily cash allowance of $75 per day. The 
seven days per year after 1983 to a maxinu 
The remaining percentage of accumulat 
provisions of the schedule shall be conve 
insurance which shall be paid on the ba: 
each accumulated, unused sick leave day. ' 
the employee becomes eligible for medicare 
(3) Any costs or savings for this act 
not be appropriated by the legislature. 
History: U.C.A.; L. 1983, ch. 332, § 6; 1983, 
ch. 334, § 1. 
67-19-15. (1) Except as otherwise pro1 
promulgated hereunder for federally aidec 
be exempt from the career service provisioi 
(a) 'The governor, members of the legisl 
(b) Persons appointed to fill vacancies 
state legislature, employees of the state ju 
sions, and heads of departments appointed 
serving ex officio, and members of state ; 
by the governing bodies of the department* 
(c) All employees and officers in the offi 
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departments, agencies2 and major offices; 
duties have a direct and substantial effect 
tration generally; those employees whose 
and defense of administration policy; and 
tionship to elected officials and to heads oi 
offices. All positions designated as being e 
shall be listed in the rules and regulation 
title and department or agency and any ( 
an amendment to the rules and regulation? 
(e) Unskilled employees in positions i 
training. A roster of all such positions sh, 
department or agency shall be maintaine 
ment on a current basis and the roster sha 
(f) Part-time professional noncareer pe 
ical and other professional service, and w 
of administrative duties; 
(g) Officers, faculty^ and other employ 
institutions of higher education; 
(h) Teaching staff of all state instituti 
in state institutions; 
(i) Persons employed in a professional 
a temporary and special inquiry, investigat 
islature or a legislative committee thereof < 
(j) Noncareer employees compensated 
tractual basis who are hired for limited 
months, or who are employed on less than < 
(2) The civil service shall consist of thr< 
(a) Schedule A — The exempted schec 
(1) of this section. Removal from any app( 
X)YEES 
rtry. The same provisions that 
irket change adjustments and 
n. The provisions of subsection 
n-grade salary increases shall 
^standards and requirements 
lish a reasonable progression 
ster. 
tal compensation program of 
ensation shall include but not 
, job security, group insurance 
are or may be offered to state 
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he s m ^ ^ s l ^ ^ a cross se^ 
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I uneven responses. 
compensation plan to the gov-
ndings and recommendations 
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lature. The governor's budget 
state employee compensation 
sent shall, as an incentive to 
lations governing procedures 
sed sick leave days, any sick 
excess of eight, at the option 
£9 ochcduled vacation period 
ty be converted into paid-up 
tent by the employing depart 
uteted -sick 4eave -fee -a -suppk-
itircmcnt board carried as 
: a later date as annual leave, 
surance at the time of retire-
; department of one month's 
? -§k*i§ JE§Y J>§ J^anl lor _accu_-
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(f) At age 65, or thereafter, 25% of accumulated unused sick leave shall be con-
verted to a cash payment. A maximum of 50 days may be allowed with a maximum 
daily cash allowance of $75 per day. The maximum number of days may increase 
seven days per year after 1983 to a maximum of 99 days. 
The remaining percentage of accumulated, unused sick leave under each of the 
provisions of the schedule shall be converted to pre-paid employee group health 
insurance which shall be paid on the basis of one month's health insurance for 
each accumulated, unused sick leave day. The insurance ]s to remain m effect until 
the employee becomes eligible for medicare or medicaid. 
(3) Any costs or savings for this act shall _be borne by the agency and shall 
not be appropriated by the legislature. 
History: 
ch.334, §1. 
U.C.A.; L. 1983, ch. 332, § 6; 1983, 
67-19-15. (1) Except as otherwise provided by law or by rules and regulations 
promulgated hereunder for federally aided programs, the following positions shall 
be exempt from the career service provisions of this act: 
(a) The governor, members of the legislature, and all other elected state officers; 
(b) Persons appointed to fill vacancies in elective positions, employees of the 
state legislature, employees of the state judiciary, members of boards and commis-
sions, and heads of departments appointed by the governor, state and local officials 
serving ex officio, and members of state and local boards and councils appointed 
by the governing bodies of the departments; 
(c) All employees and officers in the office and at the residence of the governor; 
(d) Those employees who make final policy decisions, including all heads of 
departments, agendesI and major offices; those heads of subordinate units whose 
duties have a direct and substantial effect on the public relations of state adminis-
tration generally; those employees whose regular duties include public advocacy 
and defense of administration policy; and those in a personal and confidential rela-
tionship to elected officials and to heads of departments, agencies2 and other major 
offices. All positions designated as being exempt pursuant to under this subsection 
shall be listed in the rules and regulations promulgated under this act by the job 
title and department or agency and any change in exempt status shall constitute 
an amendment to the rules and regulations; 
(e) Unskilled employees in positions requiring little or no specialized skill or 
training. A roster of all such positions showing job title, number of positions^ and 
department or agency shall be maintained by the director of personnel manage-
ment on a current basis and the roster shall be available for public review; 
(f) Part-time professional noncareer persons, who are paid for any form of med-
ical and other professional service, and who are not engaged in the performance 
of administrative duties; 
(g) Officers, facultyi and other employees of state universities and other state 
institutions of higher education; 
(h) Teaching staff of all state institutions, and patients and inmates employed 
in state institutions; 
(i) Persons employed in a professional or scientific capacity to make or conduct 
a temporary and special inquiry, investigation, or examination on behalf of the leg-
islature or a legislative committee thereof or by authority of the governor; and 
(j) Noncareer employees compensated for their services on a seasonal or con-
tractual basis who are hired for limited periods of less than nine consecutive 
months, or who are employed on less than one-half time basis. 
(2) The civil service shall consist of three two schedules, as follows: 
(a) Schedule A — The exempted schedule made pursuant ^e under subsection 
(1) of this section. Removal from any appointive position under schedule A, unless 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "D" 
Senate Bill 4 (1983) (superseded prior to going into effect) 
[1651] STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES Ch. 18 
(b), their successors shall be appointed by the governor, with the advice and 
consent of the senate, from each of the districts provided for in subsection 
(1) (a), and shall be appointed for terms of office of four years each. Not 
more than four members shall be from the same political party. Vacancies 
occurring among the appointed members of the board by reason of death, 
resignation, or other cause shall be filled by the appointment of another 
person by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, for the 
unexpired term of the person whose office was vacated and shall be from the 
district provided for in subsection (1) (a) as to which the vacancy has thus 
occurred. 
(3) Upon the first expiration of terms of appointed members following 
the effective date of this act, and thereafter one of the successors appointed 
under subsection (2) of this section shall be actively engaged in a livestock 
grazing operation using state lands. 
(4) The board shall appoint its chairman from its membership, and five 
members of the board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of busi-
ness and for the holding of hearings. 
Section 2. Effective date. 
This act shall take effect upon approval and shall have retrospective appli-
cation to May 10, 1983. 
Approved June 24, 1983. 
STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
CHAPTER 18 
(Passed June 23. 1983 In effect September 20, 1983 ) 
EARLY RETIREMENT INCENTIVES 
By Senator Pugh 
AN ACT RELATING TO STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES; PROVIDING FOR THE USE 
OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' ACCUMULATED, UNUSED SICK LEAVE AS AN INCENTIVE 
FOR RETIREMENT. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 67-19-14, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS LAST 
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 334, LAWS OF UTAH 1983. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 67-19-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 
334, Laws of Utah 1983, is amended to read: 
67-19-14. Converted sick leave—Early retirement incentive. 
Ch. 18 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES [1652] 
(1) The director of personnel management shall, as an incentive to 
reduce sick leave abuse, promulgate rules and regulations governing proce-
dures whereby, after an employee has accumulated 18 unused sick leave days, 
any sick leave days accumulated during any calendar year in excess of eight, 
at the option of that employee, may be converted to the employee's sched-
uled vacation period the following year. 
(2) [M] The director of personnel management, to provide an incentive 
for early retirement for all employees, shall promulgate rules and regulations 
for implementation of the following: at the time of retirement, any employee 
of the state may be paid for accumulated, unused sick leave with payment 
based on the employee's rate of pay at the time of retirement. [Any] The 
agreement must be voluntarily entered into by both the affected employee 
and the employing department. [The department must pay the employee the 
monies] The employing department may enter into the agreement provided 
there is no cost increase for personal service. The cash payment owed under 
the provisions of this bill shall be made within the fiscal year of [his/her] the 
employee's retirement. If the employee retires [before age 65,] under the 
early retirement incentive program, the accumulated, unused sick leave shall 
be converted according to the following schedule: 
(a) Prior to, or at age 60, 50% of accumulated unused sick leave shall be 
converted to a cash payment or equivalent group health insurance or a combi-
nation of the two; 
(b) At age 61, 45% of accumulated unused sick leave shall be converted 
to a cash payment or equivalent group health insurance or a combination of 
the two; 
(c) At age 62, 40% of accumulated unused sick leave shall be converted to 
a cash payment or equivalent group health insurance or a combination of the 
two; 
(d) At age 63, 35% of accumulated unused sick leave shall be converted 
to a cash payment or equivalent group health insurance or a combination of 
the two; 
(e) At age 64, 30% of accumulated unused sick leave shall be converted 
to a cash payment or equivalent group health insurance or a combination of 
the two; and 
(f) At age 65, or thereafter, 25% of accumulated unused sick leave shall 
be converted to a cash payment or equivalent group health insurance or a 
combination of the two. [A maximum of 50 days may be allowed with a maxi-
mum daily cash allowance of $75 per day. The maximum number of days may 
increase seven days per year after 1983 to a maximum of 99 days.] 
[The remaining percentage of accumulated, unused sick leave under each 
of the provisions of the schedule shall be converted to pre paid employee 
group health insurance which shall be paid on the basis of one month's health 
insurance for each accumulated, unused sick leave day. The insurance is to 
remain in effect until the employee becomes eligible for medicare or medi-
eai4r] 
In each of the early retirement incentive categories in this subsection, a 
maximum of 70 days may be allowed with a maximum daily cash allowance of 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "E" 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14 (Supp. 1983) (effective August 10, 1983) 
7-1943 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
(4) The director shall submit proposals for a total compensation plan to the gov* 
•nor by October 30 of each year, setting forth findings and recommendations 
fecting state employee compensation .which the governor shall consider in the 
eparation of budget recommendations to the legislature. The governor's budget 
oposals shall include a specific recommendation on state employee compensation 
be acted upon by the legislature. 
"The recommendations shall be based on the 
consumer price index, U. S. city average, as 
published by the United States Department 
of Labor as of October 1st of the preceding 
year and shall only take place when that 
index has varied from the previous year by 
at least 2% "; added the last four sentences to 
subd. (2)(f); substituted "labor market 
change" in the first sentence of subd. (2)(g) 
and the fifth sentence of subd. (2)(i) for "cost 
of living"; rewrote subd. (2)(h) which read: 
"Adjustments to the pay plan enacted by the 
legislature shall take place on July 1 follow-
ing their enactment"; added subsecs. (3) and 
(4); and made a minor change in punctuation, 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-12, enacted by L. 
19, ch. 139, § 18; L. 1981, ch. 268, § 1; 1983, 
332, § 5. 
mpiler's Notes. 
'he 1981 amendment substituted "elected 
mbers of the executive branch and their 
mpt employees, certified employees of the 
te board of education" in the first sen-
ze of subsec. (1) for "executive positions 
>red by the plan established by the execu-
compensation commission"; substituted 
irage wage in the Utah labor market" in 
J. (2)(e) for "cost of living"; deleted the 
nd sentence of subd. (2)(e), which read: 
0 f, V A J ^ V U C H J U J J . 
M9-13. Examination of payrolls and certification of employee eligibility 
lirector. (1) The director of personnel management may examine payrolls at 
time to determine conformity with this chapter and the regulations. 
) No new employee shall be hired in a position covered by this chapter, ttnd 
employee shall be changed in pay, title or status, nor shall any employee be 
unless certified by the director as eligible under the provisions of or regula-
\ promulgated pursuant to this chapter. 
story: C. 1953, 67-19-13, enacted by L. 
ch.139, §19. 
19-14. Sick leave — Unused sick days — Early retirement program. (1) 
lirector shall, as an incentive to reduce sick leave abuse, promulgate rules and 
ations governing procedures whereby, after an employee has accumulated 18 
»d sick leave days, any sick days accumulated during any calendar year in 
s of eight, at the option of that employee, may be carried as "converted sick 
' which the employee may use at a later date as annual leave, regular sick 
or as paid-up health and medical insurance at the time of retirement on the 
of the payment by the employing department of one month's premium for 
lay of accumulated sick leave. 
(a) The director shall promulgate rules and regulations for the governance 
early retirement program. Employing departments may offer an early retire-
option to an employee. Employee participation in the early retirement pro-
shall be entirely voluntary. An employee must be eligible for retirement 
;s to qualify for the program. 
The program shall provide for an employee to be paid for 25% of unused 
iilated sick leave at the employee's preretirement rate of pay. The employing 
ment shall also provide health and life insurance benefits until the employee 
5 age 65, but not to exceed five years' coverage from the date of retirement, 
ployee's health and life insurance benefits under the program terminate at 
An employee under the age of 60, whose unused sick leave, after the 25% 
; has been paid, exceeds the 60 days maximum for five-year coverage under 
ion (b), may continue health and life insurance at the rate of one month's 
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coverage for each day of unused sick leave above 
coverage beyond age 65. 
(d) Any costs or savings for this act shall be 







and S. B. 
sion of 1 
(1st S.S.) 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-14, enacted by L. 
1983 (1st S.S.), ch. 19, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1983 (1st S.S.), ch. 19, § 1, repealed 
old section 67-19-14 (L. 1979, ch. 139, § 20; 
1983, ch. 232, § 6; 1983, ch. 334, § 1; 1983 (1st 
S.S., ch. 18, § 1), relating to sick leave rules 
and regulations, and enacted new section 
67-19-14. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to state officers and 
employees; providing options for the use of 





67-19-15. Career service — Exempt position 
positions — Tenure — Coverage of career servi 
erwise provided by law or by rules and regulation 
erally aided programs, the following positions s 
service provisions of this act: 
(a) The governor, members of the legislature, i 
(b) Persons appointed to fill vacancies in ele 
state legislature, employees of the state judiciary 
sions, and heads of departments appointed by the 
serving ex officio, and members of state and loc 
by the governing bodies of the departments; 
(c) All employees and officers in the office and 
(d) Those employees who make final policy 
departments, agenciesx and major offices; those 
duties have a direct and substantial effect on the 
tration generally; those employees whose regul; 
and defense of administration policy; and those i 
tionship to elected officials and to heads of depar 
offices. All positions designated as being exempt 
shall be listed in the rules and regulations pron 
title and department or agency and any change 
an amendment to the rules and regulations; 
(e) Unskilled employees in positions requiri 
training. A roster of all such positions showing 
department or agency shall be maintained by 
ment on a current basis and the roster shall be a 
(0 Part-time professional noncareer persons, 
ttal and other professional service, and who ar 
°f administrative duties; 
. (g) Officers, facultyr and other employees of 
institutions of higher education; 
. (h) Teaching staff of all state institutions, i 
ln
 state institutions; 
(0 Persons employed in a professional or sc 
? temporary and special inquiry, investigation, i 
Mature or a legislative committee thereof or by 
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jals for a totaJ compensation plan to the&0 J 
tting forth findings and recommendation^ 
i which the governor shall consider in n 
is to the legislature. The governor's butk 
mendation on state employee compensa 
"The recommendations shall be based on nS 
consumer price index, U. S. city average A 
published by the United States Department! 
of Labor as of October 1st of the preceding 
year and shall only take place when thJ 
index has varied from the previous year {J 
at least 2%"; added the last four sentences tj 
subd. (2)(f); substituted "labor marfcetj 
change" in the first sentence of subd. (2)(»i|| 
and the fifth sentence of subd. (2)(i) for "cost! 
of living"; rewrote subd. (2)(h) which read:* 
"Adjustments to the pay plan enacted by the 
legislature shall take place on July 1 follow. 
ing their enactment"; added subsecs. (3) and 
(4); and made a minor change in punctuation. 
ad certification of employee eligibility 
el management may examine payrolls at 
s chapter and the regulations, 
a position covered by this chapter, and 
le or status, nor shall any employee be 
gible under the provisions of or regula-
STATE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT 67-1945 
'ter date as annl?> conve*ed ** 
ranee at the tZ Veav.e' r e ^ u , a r si& 
-artaen of TrnlnT^ 0 n * one month s premium for 
oyee must be | S ? « ^ e
"giDle for retirement 
Ployee to be paid for 2W J A 
etirement rate of nav Ttf T ^ 
insurance benefitsPuitiHh?mp]rng overs™ <v !i_ , " t h e employee 
•»t> »«<Ier the p r „ g r a m l e r m i n a t e „ 
verage for each day of unused sick leave above the 60 days, but not to exceed 
Average beyond age 65. 
fd) Any costs or savings for this act shall be borne by the agency and shall 
not be appropriated by the legislature. 
History; C. 1953, 67-19-14, enacted by L. 
l983(lstS.S.),ch.l9,§l. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1983 (1st S.S.), ch. 19, § 1, repealed 
old section 67-19-14 (L. 1979, ch. 139, §20; 
1983, ch. 232, § 6; 1983, ch. 334, § 1; 1983 (1st 
SS,ch. 18, §1), relating to sick leave rules 
and' regulations, and enacted new section 
67-19-14. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to state officers and 
employees; providing options for the use of 
unused sick leave; providing for the use of 
public employees' accumulated, unused sick 
leave as an incentive for early retirement; 
and providing an effective date. 
This act repeals and reenacts section 
67-19-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
amended by Chapter 332, Laws of Utah 1983, 
and S. B. No. 4 of the 1983 First Special Ses-
sion of the 45th Legislature. — Laws 1983 
(1st S.S.), ch. 19. 
Effective Date. 
Section 2 of Laws 1983 (1st S.S.), ch. 19 
provided: "This act shall take effect upon 
approval." Approved August 10,1983. 
67-19-15. Career service — Exempt positions — Schedules for civil service 
positions — Tenure — Coverage of career service provisions. (1) Except as oth-
erwise provided by law or by rules and regulations promulgated hereunder for fed-
erally aided programs, the following positions shall be exempt from the career 
service provisions of this act: 
(a) The governor, members of the legislature, and all other elected state officers; 
(b) Persons appointed to fill vacancies in elective positions, employees of the 
state legislature, employees of the state judiciary, members of boards and commis-
sions, and heads of departments appointed by the governor, state and local officials 
serving ex officio, and members of state and local boards and councils appointed 
by the governing bodies of the departments; 
(c) All employees and officers in the office and at the residence of the governor; 
(d) Those employees who make final policy decisions, including all heads of 
departments, agencies^ and major offices; those heads of subordinate units whose 
duties have a direct and substantial effect on the public relations of state adminis-
tration generally; those employees whose regular duties include public advocacy 
and defehBe of administration policy; and those in a personal and confidential rela-
tionship to elected officials and to heads of departments, agencies2 and other major 
offices. All positions designated as being exempt pursuant to under this subsection 
shall be lifted in the rules and regulations promulgated under this act by the job 
title and department or agency and any change in exempt status shall constitute 
an amendment to the rules and regulations; 
(e) Unskilled employees in positions requiring little or no specialized skill or 
training. A roster of all such positions showing job title, number of positions^ and 
department or agency shall be maintained by the director of personnel manage-
ment on a current basis and the roster shall be available for public review; 
(f) Part-time professional noncareer persons, who are paid for any form of med-
ical and other professional service, and who are not engaged in the performance 
of administrative duties; 
(g) Officers, faculty^ and other employees of state universities and other state 
institutions of higher education; 
(h) Teaching staff of all state institutions, and patients and inmates employed 
in state institutions; 
(i) Persons employed in a professional or scientific capacity to make or conduct 
a temporary and special inquiry, investigation, or examination on behalf of the leg-
islature or a legislative committee thereof or by authority of the governor; and 
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Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14 (Supp. 1989) 
67-19-14 
blic and private employers in con- ! 
lis for a total compensation plan to 
r, setting forth findings and recom-
compensation. 
J director's proposals in preparing 
islature. 
to the Legislature shall include a 
ployee compensation. 
i); substituted "statute" for "law" at the 
of Subsection (2)(f); substituted "Office of 
Attorney General" for "attorney general's 
e" at the end of Subsection (2)(g); deleted 
,he Division of Personnel Management" at 
end of Subsection (2)(i), substituted "The 
irtment" for "DPM" at the beginning of 
section (3)(d); substituted "adopt" for "pro-
la te" in Subsection (4)(a); substituted "de-
ment shall design the pay plans" for "pay 
s shall be designed" in Subsection (4)(b); 
ote Subsection (4)(b)(ix) which had read 
pay plans and any adjustments shall be 
oved by the Legislature in a general ap-
riations act and shall take effect on July 1 
•ving their enactment"; deleted "but not be 
ed to" following "shall include" in Subsec-
(5)(b); substituted "the department" for 
A" in the first sentence of Subsection 
; inserted "to the Legislature" following 
get proposals" and deleted "to be acted 
by the Legislature" at the end of Subsec-
6)(c); and substituted "use" for "utilize" in 
Dlaces. 
benefit Program — Rule-
to establish program. 
endar year 1990 and thereafter a 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 
nits for all employees eligible for 
>quirements of the Internal Reve-
ts section shall include employee 
services. 
le option of the employee, out-of-
tt care expenses, 
cpenses allowed under the Inter-
e 63, the Utah Administrative 
rules to implement the program 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-12.5, enacted by L. 
]989, ch. 200, § 1. 
Internal Revenue Code . — The Internal 
jftevenue Code of 1986, referred to in Subsec-
tions (1) to (3), is Title 26 of the U.S. Code. 
Section 125 of the Code appears as 26 U.S.C. 
§ 125. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 200, § 2 
makes the act effective on March 14, 1989. 
167-19-14. Sick leave — Unused sick days — Early retire-
ment program — Line of duty death benefit. 
(1) The director shall, as an incentive to reduce sick leave abuse, promul-
gate rules governing procedures whereby, after an employee has accumulated 
18 unused sick leave days, any sick days accumulated during any calendar 
jyear in excess of eight, at the option of that employee, may be carried as 
Converted sick leave" which the employee may use at a later date as annual 
leave, regular sick leave, or as paid-up health and medical insurance at the 
jtime of retirement on the basis of the payment by the employing department 
jof one month's premium for each day of accumulated sick leave. 
(2) (a) The director shall promulgate rules and regulations for the gover-
nance of an early retirement program. Employing departments may offer 
an early retirement option to an employee. Employee participation in the 
early retirement program shall be entirely voluntary. An employee must 
T)e eligible for retirement benefits to qualify for the program. 
(b) The program shall provide for an employee to be paid for 25% of 
unused accumulated sick leave at the employee's preretirement rate of 
pay. The employing department shall also provide health and life insur-
ance benefits until the employee reaches age 65, but not to exceed five 
years' coverage from the date of retirement. An employee's health and life 
insurance benefits under the program terminate at death. 
(c) An employee under the age of 60, whose unused sick leave, after the 
25% cashout has been paid, exceeds the 60 days maximum for five-year 
coverage under Subsection (b), may continue health and life insurance at 
the rate of one month's coverage for each day of unused sick leave above 
the 60 days, but not to exceed coverage beyond age 65. 
(d) Any costs or savings for this act shall be borne by the agency and 
shall not be appropriated by the Legislature. 
(3) (a) The director shall promulgate rules to provide a continuation of 
health and dental insurance to the surviving spouse and family of any 
state employee whose death occurs in the line of duty. The insurance 
coverage shall continue for a period of five years or until the surviving 
spouse realizes age 65, whichever comes first. 
(b) The rules shall also provide for a cashout of 25% of accumulated 
sick-leave in the same manner as provided under Subsection (2)(b). 
(c) The costs of paying for the benefits under Subsections (3)(a) and (b) 
shall be included in the agency's budget request each year following the 
date of death of the employee. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-14, enacted by L. 
§983 (1st S.S), ch. 19, § 1; 1988, ch. 46, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective March 9, 1988, in Subsection 
1) deleted "and regulations" following "rules" 
fad added Subsection (3). 
Meaning of "this act." — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to this section in 
bound volume. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14 (Supp. 1993) 
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ay. The employing department shall also provide health and life insiff: 
rice benefits until the employee reaches age 65, but not to exceed fill 
Bars' coverage from the date of retirement. An employee's health and lfje 
lsurance benefits under the program terminate a t death. f 
(c) An employee under the age of 60, whose unused sick leave, after tH 
5% cashout has been paid, exceeds the 60 days maximum for five-y^p 
>verage under Subsection (b), may continue health and life insurance, at 
le rate of one month's coverage for each day of unused sick leave above 
le 60 days, but not to exceed coverage beyond age 65. 
(d) Any costs or savings for this act shall be borne by the agency ai\d 
lall not be appropriated by the Legislature. 
(a) The director shall promulgate rules to provide a continuation of 
*alth and dental insurance to the surviving spouse and family of any 
ate employee whose death occurs in the line of duty. The insurance 
•verage shall continue for a period of five years or until the surviving 
>ouse realizes age 65, whichever comes first. 
(b) The rules shall also provide for a cashout of 25% of accumulate 
ck-leave in the same manner as provided under Subsection (2)(b)^ 
(c) The costs of paying for the benefits under Subsections (3)(a) and (b) 
Lall be included in the agency's budget request each year following the 
ite of death of the employee. 
Sick le^ve — Unused sick days — Early re-
tirement program [Effective July 1, 1994]. 
The director shall, as an incentive to reduce sick leave abuse, ma£e 
governing procedures whereby, after an employee has accumulated 18 
1 sick leave days, any sick days accumulated during any calendar year 
>ss of eight, at the option of that employee, may be carried as "converted 
save" which the employee may use at a later date as annual leave, 
r sick leave, or as paid-up health and medical insurance at the time pf 
lent on the basis of the payment by the employing department of one 
's premium for each day of accumulated sick leave. lp 
a) (i) The director shall make rules for the governance of an early 
retirement program. 
(ii) Employing departments may offer an early retirement option 
to an employee. 
(iii) Employee participation in the early retirement program shajl 
be entirely voluntary. *. 
(iv) An employee must be eligible for retirement benefits to qualify 
for the program. 
b) (i) The program shall provide for an employee to be paid for 25% of 
unused accumulated sick leave at the employee's preretirement rate 
of pay. 
(ii) The employing department shall also provide health and life 
insurance benefits until the employee becomes eligible for Medicare, 
but not to exceed five years' coverage from the date of retirement, j 
c) An employee under the age of 60, whose unused sick leave, after the | 
Jo cashout has been paid, exceeds the 60 days maximum for five-year | 
rerage under Subsection (b), may continue health and life insurance at | 
\ rate of one month's coverage for each day of unused sick leave above j 
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the 60 days, but not to exceed coverage b 
care. 
(d) Any costs or savings for this act si 
shall not be appropriated by the Legis 
(3) (a) The director shall make rules to p 
and dental insurance to the surviving 
employee whose death occurs in the line 
shall continue for a period of five year 
becomes eligible for Medicare, whiche\ 
(b) The rules shall also provide for a 
sick leave in the same manner as pro 
(c) The costs of paying for the benefits 
shall be included in the agency's budgel 
date of death of the employee. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-14, enacted by L. subdi 
1983 (1st S.S.), ch. 19, § 1; 1988, ch. 46, § 1; tuted 
1993, ch. 164, § 1. the r 
Amended effective July 1, 1994. — Laws and ( 
1993, ch. 164, § 1 amends this section effective of Si 
July 1, 1994. See amendment note below. ployc 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- der 
ment, effective March 9, 1988, in Subsection mad» 
(1) deleted "and regulations" following "rules" M< 
and added Subsection (3). ing t 
The 1993 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, bour 
67-19-15. Career service — Exen 
for civil service positic 
service provisions. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law 
lished for federally aided programs, the fol 
the career service provisions of this chap 
(a) the governor, members of the 1 
state officers, designated as Schedule 
(b) heads of departments appointee 
Schedule AB; 
(c) all employees and officers in th€ 
governor, designated as Schedule AC 
(d) division directors, heads of insti 
who are appointed by the departmeni 
other appointees who are in a person 
that department head or commissior 
(e) unskilled employees in position 
skill or training, designated as Sche 
(f) part-time professional noncareer 
of medical and other professional serv 
Performance of administrative dutie; 
(g) attorneys in the attorney gener 
career service pay plan, designated 
(h) teaching staff of all state inst 
employed in state institutions, desi^ 
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ill also provide health and life ins% 
>aehes age 65, but not to exceed fiVe 
•ement. An employee's health and life 
"am terminate at death. 
30, whose unused sick leave, after the 
> the 60 days maximum for five-year 
continue health and life insurance at 
each day of unused sick leave above 
'erage beyond age 65. 
ict shall be borne by the agency and 
legislature. 
1
 rules to provide a continuation of 
surviving spouse and family of any 
in the line of duty. The insurance 
I of five years or until the surviving 
comes first 
or a cashout of 25% of accumulated 
provided under Subsection (2)(b). 
efits under Subsections (3)(a) and (b) 
dget request each year following the 
used sick days — Early re-
ffective July 1, 1994]. 
e to reduce sick leave abuse, make 
er an employee has accumulated 18 
cumulated during any calendar year 
iployee, may be carried as "converted 
se at a later date as annual leave, 
md medical insurance at the time of 
by the employing department of one 
nulated sick leave, 
lies for the governance of an early 
lay offer an early retirement option 
I the early retirement program shall 
ible for retirement benefits to qualify 
or an employee to be paid for 25% of 
it the employee's preretirement rate 
it shall also provide health and life 
»loyee becomes eligible for Medicare, 
verage from the date of retirement. 
0, whose unused sick leave, after the 
the 60 days maximum for five-year 
ontinue health and life insurance at 
each day of unused sick leave above 
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 67-19-15 
the 60 days, but not to exceed coverage beyond the age eligible for Medi-
care. 
(d) Any costs or savings for this act shall be borne by the agency and 
shall not be appropriated by the Legislature. 
(3) (a) The director shall make rules to provide a continuation of health 
and dental insurance to the surviving spouse and family of any state 
employee whose death occurs in the line of duty. The insurance coverage 
shall continue for a period of five years or until the surviving spouse 
becomes eligible for Medicare, whichever comes first. 
(b) The rules shall also provide for a cashout of 25% of accumulated 
sick leave in the same manner as provided under Subsection (2)(b). 
(c) The costs of paying for the benefits under Subsections (3)(a) and (b) 
shall be included in the agency's budget request each year following the 
date of death of the employee. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-14, enacted by L. 
1983 (1st S.S.), ch. 19, § 1; 1988, ch. 46, § 1; 
1993, ch. 164, § 1. 
Amended effective July 1, 1994. — Laws 
1993, ch. 164, § 1 amends this section effective 
July 1, 1994. See amendment note below. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective March 9, 1988, in Subsection 
(1) deleted "and regulations" following "rules" 
and added Subsection (3). 
The 1993 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, 
subdivided Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b); substi-
tuted eligibility for Medicare for "age 65" as 
the milestone in Subsections (2)(b)(ii), (2)(c), 
and (3)(a); deleted the former second sentence 
of Subsection (2)(b)(ii), which read: "An em-
ployee's health and life insurance benefits un-
der the program terminate at death"; and 
made stylistic changes. 
Meaning of "this act." — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to this section in 
bound volume. 
67-19-15. Career service — Exempt positions — Schedules 
for civil service positions — Coverage of career 
service provisions, 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law or by ftiles and regulations estab-
lished for federally aided programs, the following positions are exempt from 
the career service provisions of this chapter: 
(a) the governor, members of the Legislature, and all other elected 
state officers, designated as Schedule AA; 
(b) heads of departments appointed by the governor, designated as 
Schedule AB; 
(c) all employees and officers in the office and at the residence of the 
governor, designated as Schedule AC; 
(d) division directors, heads of institutions, and heads of major offices 
who are appointed by the department head or commissioner, and those 
other appointees who are in a personal and confidential relationship to 
that department head or commissioner, designated as Schedule AD; 
(e) unskilled employees in positions requiring little or no specialized 
skill or training, designated as Schedule AE; 
(f) part-time professional noncareer persons who are paid for any form 
of medical and other professional service and who are not engaged in the 
performance of administrative duties, designated as Schedule AF; 
(g) attorneys in the attorney general's office who are under their owr 
career service pay plan, designated as Schedule AG; 
(h) teaching staff of all state institutions and patients and inmate? 
employed in state institutions, designated as Schedule AH; 
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with schedules indicating the 
\ the source of funds 
Bgislature in a general appro 
-ct on the July 1 following the 
- the total compensation pro 
^rvice 
employee benefits are compa-
and public employers using 
mployee Benefits Survey Data 
nmerce Research Center, or 
lationally recognized benefits 
or a state employee compensa 
>ach year, setting forth findings 
loyee compensation 
ector's proposals m preparing 
ire 
the Legislature shall include a 
e compensation 
997 amendment b \ ch 213 effective 
1997 redesignated former Subsections 
to (2)(a)(ix) as (2)(a) to (2)(i) and deleted 
Subsections (2)(a)(x) to (2)(a)(xi) and 
ubstituted "meet career sen ice exempt 
as denned m Subsection 67 19 15(lXk) 
merit exempt employees' in Subjection 
ubstituted "that is determined bj stat 
>e exempt from this Subsection (2) for 
uch the salary is set b> statute m 
tion (2)(f) made stylistic changes in 
tion (3Kb) and redesignated former 
tions (4)(c)(x)(i) to (4Xc)(x)(m) as 
)(A) to (4)(c)(x)(C) 
section is set out as reconciled by the 
of Legislative Research and General 
>1 
ional officer, and public 
el pay plans. 
cers, as defined under Section 
ler Section 53-13-104, and pubbc 
53-6-102 employed by the state 
S a r y ranges for law enforcement 
safety dispatchers shall be basea 
,f benefits of the three largest mw 
ties employing correctional omc 
public safety dispatcher , respec-
state, and ,*9 
the director shall consider tne 
nternal comparisons, and ot 
recruit and retain the high** 
qualified law enforcement officers, correctional officers, and public safety 
dispatchers 
History: C. 1953,67-19-12 3, enacted by L 
1996, ch. 283, § 2; 1997, ch. 213, § 3; 1998, 
ch 244, § 1; 1998, ch. 282, § 64 
Amendment Notes — The 1997 amend 
merit effective May 5, 1997, substituted "com 
parabihty of state salary ranges for" for "com 
patibihty survey for the state s" and substituted 
"survey of salary ranges and benefits' for "for 
the rank corresponding peace officers", added 
"and correctional officers" after "peace officers" 
and added "based on a" before total compensa 
tion survey", and deleted former Subsections 
(2) and (3) which pertained to the market 
compatibility survey and considerations for 
compensation 
The 1998 amendment by ch 244, effective 
July 1, 1998 divided the existing provision 
adding the (1) designation inserted "and public 
safety dispatchers as defined under Section 
53 6 102" m the introductory paragraph m 
Subsection (1) inserted "and public safety dis 
patchers" before "shall be based on a", deleted 
"total compensation thereafter and substituted 
"survey of benefits' for "benefits " and inserted 
the language beginning "three largest" and 
ending respectively", and added Subsection 
(2), making a related change 
The 1998 amendment by ch 282, effective 
May 4, 1998, substituted "law enforcement of 
ficers" for "peace officers" in two places and 
updated internal references 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel 
Coordination Clause. — Laws 1998, ch 
282, § 86, provides "If this bill and H B 60 [ch 
2441, Compensation for Public Safety Dispatch 
ers, both pass, it is the intent of the Legislature 
that the reference in Subsection 67 19 12 3(2) 
to 'peace* shall be deleted and 'law enforcement' 
shall be inserted m its place " 
Original section references appearing in the 
1998 amendments to this section were changed 
by the Office of Legislative Research and Gen 
eral Counsel to reflect technical renumberings 
Appropriations. — Laws 1998, ch 244 § 2 
appropriates from the General Fund, for fiscal 
year 1998 99, to the Department of Public 
Safety, for the compensation of public safety 
dispatchers employed by the state 
67-1H 1 L Sick leave — Unused sick days — Early retire-
ment program, 
(1) The director shall, as an incentive to reduce sick leave abuse, make rules 
governing procedures whereby, after an employee has accumulated 18 unused 
sick leave days, any sick days accumulated during any calendar year m excess 
of eight, at the option of that employee, may be carried as "converted sick 
leave" which the employee may use at a later date as annual leave, regular sick 
leave, or as paid-up health and medical insurance at the time of retirement on 
the basis of the payment by the employing department of one month's premium 
fir each day of accumulated sick leave 
H2) (a) (1) The director shall make rules for the governance of an early 
retirement program 
(n) Employing departments may offer an early retirement option to 
an employee 
(in) Employee participation m any part of the early retirement 
program shall be entirely voluntary 
(IV) An employee must be eligible for retirement benefits to qualify 
for the program 
(b) (i) (A) The program shall provide for an employee to be paid for 
25% of unused accumulated sick leave at the employee's 
preretirement rate of pay 
(B) An employee shall have the option of having all monies 
from the cashout under Subsection (b)(1)(A) transferred directly 
to the deferred compensation plan qualified under Section 401(k) 
of the Internal Revenue Code which is sponsored by the Utah 
State Retirement Board 
(n) The employing department shall also provide health and life 
insurance benefits until the employee becomes eligible for Medicare, 
in %fp 
STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 190 
but not to exceed five years' coverage from the date of retirement, 
except as provided under Subsection (2)(c) 
) (i) An employee under the age of 60, whose unused sick leave, after 
the 25% cashout has been paid, exceeds the 60 days maximum for 
five-year coverage under Subsection (b), may continue health and life 
insurance at the rate of one month's coverage for each day of unused 
sick leave above the 60 days, but only to the age eligible for Medicare 
If the employee has reached the age eligible for Medicare, coverage for 
the employee's spouse may continue under this Subsection (c)(i) until 
the employee's spouse reaches the age eligible for Medicare 
(n) An employee and the employee's spouse who are eligible for 
Medicare may purchase Medicare supplemental insurance at the rate 
of one month's coverage for each day of the employee's unused sick 
leave 
t) Any costs or savings for this act shall be borne by the agency and 
11 not be appropriated by the Legislature 
) The director shall make rules to provide a continuation of health and 
tal insurance to the surviving spouse and family of any state employee 
>se death occurs in the line of duty The insurance coverage shall 
tmue for a period of five years or until the surviving spouse becomes 
lble for Medicare, whichever comes first 
0 The rules shall also provide for a cashout of 25% of accumulated sick 
re m the same manner as provided under Subsection (2)(b). 
) The costs of paying for the benefits under Subsections (3)(a) and (b) 
II be included in the agency's budget request each year following the 
1
 of death of the employee 
r: C. 1953, 67-19-14, e n a c t e d by L 
S.S ), c h . 19, § 1; 1988, ch . 46, § 1, 
164, § 1; 1998, eh . 338, § 1 
m e n t N o t e s . — The 1998 amend 
etive July 1, 1998 inserted "any part 
)section (2)(a)(m) added Subsection 
I, redesignating Subsection (2)(b)(i) 
as (2)(b)dXA), added "except as provided under 
Subsection (2)(c)" at the end of Subsection 
(2)(b)(n), added (2)(c)(n), redesignating Subsec 
tion (2)(c) as (2)(cXi), and in Subsection (2J(cXi), 
substituted "only to" for "not to exceed coverage 
beyond" near the end of the first sentence and 
added the second sentence 
15. Career service — Exempt positions — Schedules 
for civil service positions — Coverage of career 
service provisions. 
tcept as otherwise provided by law or by rules and regulations 
led for federally aided programs, the following positions are exempt 
1
 career service provisions of this chapter 
) the governor, members of the Legislature, and all other elected state 
ers, designated as Schedule AA, 
) the agency heads enumerated m Section 67-22-2, and commission-
designated as Schedule AB, 
) all employees and officers m the office and at the residence of the 
>rnor, designated as Schedule AC, . 
) employees who are m a confidential relationship to an agency b e a 
ommissioner and who report directly to, and are supervised b$ a 
artment head, commissioner, or deputy director of an agency or i 
ivalent, designated as Schedule AD, .^ , 
) unskilled employees in positions requiring little or no special*? 
[ or training, designated as Schedule AE, 
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(f) part-time professional noncaieei 
of medical and othei professional servi 
performance of administrative duties, < 
(g) attorneys m the attorney genera 
career service pay plan, designated as 
(h) teaching staff of all state msti t 
employed in state institutions, designa 
(I) persons appointed to a position v 
right to return under federal or state la\ 
AI, 
(j) noncareer employees compensatec 
contractual basis who are hired for 1 
consecutive months or who are emplc 
designated as Schedule AJ, 
(k) those employees m a personal 
elected officials, designated as Schedule 
(1) employees appointed to perform 
exceeding two years or to perform v 
designated as Schedule AL, 
(m) employees of the Department of < 
opment whose positions are designated a 
by the executive director of the Departir 
Development with the concurrence of the 
AM, 
(n) employees of the Legislature, desi 
(o) employees of the judiciary, design* 
(p) all judges m the judiciary, designa 
(q) members of state and local board 
governor and governing bodies of agenci 
an ex officio capacity, officers, faculty, 
universities and other state institutions o 
Schedule AQ, 
(r) employees who make statewide po 
and 
(s) any other employee whose appointi 
career service exempt, designated as Seb 
(2) The civil service shall consist of two scl 
(a) (i) Schedule A is the schedule con* 
Subsection (1) 
(n) Removal from any appointive p 
otherwise regulated by statute, is at 
officers without regard to tenure 
(b) Schedule B is the competitive caree 
all positions filled through competitive se 
the director 
<3) (a) The director, after consultation witl 
tive branch departments and agencies 
governor, shall allocate positions to the aj 
section 
(b) Agency heads shall make requests 
director before changing the schedule assij 
position 
(c) Unless the director's decision is reve 
director denies an agency's request, the d 
lab I 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "I" 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14 (Supp. 1999) 
:ERS AND EMPLOYEES 
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(2)(c); subst tuted "that is determined L I n 1 9 7 
ipt from this Subsection (olfe?*-*-
Accumulated annual leave — Conversion to 
deferred compensation plan. ute to be exem  
"for which the salary is set by stawB 
Subsection (2)(f); made stylistic chanoJI , i n • i . i * * 
Subsection (3)(b); and redesignated [ I (i) The department shall implement a program whereby an employee may, 
Subsections (4)(c)(x)(i) to (4)(cXxXiiji
 o n termination of employment or retirement, elect to convert any unused 
(4)(c)(xKA) o (4)(c)(x)(C). |pP j ]eaVe into any of the employee's designated deferred compensation 
This sect on is set out as reconciled ^W**^ f
 q t h a t : 
Office of Legislative Research and GeJpcc0U 
Counsel. 
correctional officer, 
personnel pay plans. 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Unused sick days — Retirement 
(a) are sponsored by the Utah State Retirement Board; and 
(b) are qualified under Section 401(k) or Section 457 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. 
DuUl (2) Any annual leave converted under Subsection (1) shall be converted into 
|L employee's deferred compensation account at the employee's pay rate a t 
She time of termination or retirement. 
ment officers, as defined under Seci (3) No employee may convert hours of accrued annual leave to the extent 
defined under Section 53-13-104, and pAhat any hours so converted would exceed the maximum amount authorized by 
er Section 53-6-102 employed by thesifhe Internal Revenue Code for each calendar year. 
I, except that: 
y of s tate salary ranges for law enforceiJ History: C. 1953,67-19-12.7, enacted by L. Effective Dates. - Laws 1999, ch. 125 
nd public safety cfepatchers shall b e * * ^ * ^ .
 T h e I n t e m a l Benam
 h
™™ ^ ^ °"




 p M t t 0 
id survey of benefits of the three la rges t*^
 cited in Subsections (l)(b) and (3), is Title 
irgest entities employing correctional 0^5 of the U.S. Code. 
mploying publ c safety dispatchers, 
don of the state; and §57-19-14. S i c k l e a v e 
aensation, the director shall consider m p r o g r a m . 
ion (1), internal comparisons, and olg 
state to recruit and retain the higH d) The director shall, as an incentive to reduce sick leave abuse, make rules 
:ers correctional officers and public safraoverning procedures whereby, after an employee has accumulated 18 unused 
^ick leave days, any sick days accumulated during any calendar year in excess 
bf eight, at the option of that employee, may be carried as "converted sick 
yL. ending "respectively"; and added Subsajeavenwnicn the employee may use at a later date as annual leave, regular sick 
•98, (2), making a related change. ^Beave, or as paid-up health and medical insurance at the time of retirement on 
The 1998 amendment by ch. 282, effifthe basis of the payment by the employing department of one month's premium 
for each day of accumulated sick leave. 
(2) (a) (i) The director shall make rules for the governance of a retirement 
program. 
(ii) Employing departments may offer the retirement option to an 
employee. 
(iii) Employee participation in any part of the retirement program 
shall be entirely voluntary. 
(iv) An employee must be eligible for retirement benefits to qualify 
for the program, 
(b) (i) (A) When an employee retires, the program shall provide for the 
employee to be paid for 25% of the employee's unused accumu-
lated sick leave at the employee's preretirement rate of pay. 
(B) An employee shall have the option of having all monies 
from the cashout under Subsection (b)(1)(A) transferred directly 
to the deferred compensation plan qualified under Section 401(k) 
of the Internal Revenue Code which is sponsored by the Utah 
State Retirement Board. 
(ii) The employing department shall also provide the same health 
and life insurance benefits the employee has at the time of retirement 
until the employee becomes eligible for Medicare, but this benefit may 
not exceed five years' coverage from the date of retirement, except as 





















May 4, 1998, substituted "law enforcement 
ficers" for "peace officers" in two places 
updated internal references. 
This section is set out as reconciled bj 
Office of Legislative Research and Gesj 
Counsel. 
C o o r d i n a t i o n Clause . — Laws 1998,1 
282, § 86, provides: "If this bill and H.BJ[ 
244], Compensation for Public Safety Dispft 
ers, both pass, it is the intent of the Legislat] 
t ha t the Reference in Subsection 67-19-lij 
to 'peace' shall be deleted and 'law enforces 
shall be inserted in its place." 
Original section references appearing 
1998 amendments to this section were chap 
by the Office of Legislative Research andif 
eral Counsel to reflect technical renumber« 
A p p r o p r i a t i o n s . — Laws 1998, ch. 2«| 
appropriates from the General Fund, forW 
year 1998-99, to the Department ofPg 
Safety, for the compensation of public 
dispatchers employed by the state. 
19-15 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 1 (c) (1) An employee whose unused sick leave, after the 25% cashoutlj 
been paid, exceeds the 60 days maximum for five-year coverage undj 
Subsection (2Kb), may continue the health and life insurance, whc 
the employee had at the time of retirement, at the rate of one moi§ 
coverage for each day of unused sick leave above the 60 days, but oil 
to the age eligible for Medicare If the employee has reached the 2 
eligible for Medicare, coverage for the employee's spouse may contim* 
under this Subsection (2)(cKi) until the employee's spouse reaches ^  
age eligible for Medicare 
(11) An employee and the employee's spouse who are or who late 
become eligible for Medicare may purchase Medicare supplement] 
insurance at the ra te of one month's coverage for each day offfl 
employee's unused sick leave L 
(d) Any costs or savings for this act shall be borne by the agency af 
shall not be appropriated by the Legislature 
) (a) The director shall make rules to provide a continuation of health an 
dental insurance to the surviving spouse and family of any state emplojl 
whose death occurs m the line of duty The insurance coverage sin 
continue for a period of five years or until the surviving spouse becomj 
eligible for Medicare, whichever comes first 
(b) The rules shall also provide for the use of accumulated sick leave 
the same manner as provided under Subsection (2Kb) 
(c) The costs of paying for the benefits under Subsections (3)(a) andji 
shall be included m the agency's budget request each year following \ 
date of death of the employee 
tory: C. 1953, 67-19-14, enacted by L. 
(1st S.S.), ch. 19, § 1; 1988, ch. 46, § 1; 
ch. 164, § 1; 1998, ch. 338, § 1; 1999, 
U 1. 
endment Notes. — The 1998 amend 
effective July 1, 1998, inserted "any part 
Subsection (2)(aXm), added Subsection 
i)(B), redesignating Subsection (2)(b)(i) 
bXi)(A), added "except as provided under 
ction (2Xc)" at the end of Subsection 
n), added (2)(c)(ii), redesignating Subsec 
Xc) as (2Xc)(i), and m Subsection (2)(cXi), 
tuted "only to" for "not to exceed coverage 
in near the end of the first sentence and 
the second sentence 
1999 amendment, effective July 1, 1999, 
i "early" before "retirement" three times 
9-15. 
m Subsection (2), added "When an emptei 
retires" m Subsection (2)(b)(i)(A), m Sufsedl 
(2)(b)(n) inserted "the same" before "healtbw 
life insurance benefits" and "the employee!! 
at the time of retirement" thereafter, in mm 
sentence of Subsection (2)(c)(i) deleted^f 
the age of 60" before "whose unused sictt 
and inserted "which the employee hasvai 
time of retirement," inserted "or who late* 
come" in Subsection (2)(cXn), substitute • 
use" for "a cashout of 25%" m Subsection^ 
and made stylistic changes throughout ^ ^ 
tion 
Federal Law. — The Internal 
Code, cited m Subsection (2)(b)(i)(B), is 
of the U S Code 
Career service — Exempt positions — Sehecj 
for civil service positions — Coverage of ci 
service provisions. 
Except as otherwise provided by law or by rules and reg^j 
hshed for federally aided programs, the following positions are e| 
the career service provisions of this chapter 
(a) the governor, members of the Legislature, and all other elect 
fficers, designated as Schedule AA, 
(b) the agency heads enumerated m Section 67-22-2, and coroi 
rs designated as Schedule AB, 
2 5 5 PERSONNEL MANAGEME 
(c) all employees and officers in the office 
governor, designated as Schedule AC, 
(d) employees who are in a confidential re 
or commissioner and who report directly b 
department head commissioner, or deputy 
equivalent, designated as Schedule AD, 
(e) unskilled employees in positions requi 
skill or training, designated as Schedule AE, 
(f) part time professional noncareer persor 
of medical and other professional service and 
performance of administrative duties, design 
(g) attorneys in the attorney general's offic 
career service pay plan, designated as Schedi 
(h) teaching staff of all state institutions 
employed m stSte institutions, designated as 
d) persons appointed to a position vacated 
nght to return under federal or state law or po 
AI, 
(j) noncareer employees compensated for th 
contractual basis who are hired for limited 
consecutive months or who are employed oi 
designated as Schedule AJ, 
(k) those employees m a personal and c 
elected officials, designated as Schedule AK, 
(1) employees appointed to perform work 
exceeding two years or to perform work v 
designated as Schedule AL, 
(m) employees of the Department of Comm 
opment whose positions are designated as exec 
by the executive director of the Department of 
Development with the concurrence of the direci AM, 
(n) employees of the Legislature, designatec 
(o) employees of the judiciary, designated as 
(p) all judges in the judiciary, designated as 
(q) members of state and local boards and 
governor and governing bodies of agencies, oth 
an ex officio capacity, officers, faculty, and 
universities and other state institutions of highe 
Schedule AQ, 
W employees who make statewide policy, d< and 
(s) any other employee whose appointment i< 
career service exempt, designated as Schedule 
' Ifle civil service shall consist of two schedule 
ta) d) Schedule A is the schedule consisting 
Subsection (1) 
(n) Removal from any appointive positior 
otherwise regulated by statute, is at the p 
officers without regard to tenure 
'b) Schedule B is the competitive career serv 




ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "J" 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2 (2004) 
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 67-19-14.2 
(a) "Continuing medical and life insurance benefits" means the state 
provided policy of medical insurance and the state provided portion of a 
policy of life insurance, each offered at the same: 
(i) benefit level and the same proportion of state/member partici-
pation in the total premium costs as an active member as defined in 
Section 49-11-102; and 
(ii) coverage level for a member, two person, or family policy as 
provided to the member at the time of retirement. 
(b) "Converted sick leave" means leave that has been converted from 
unused sick leave in accordance with this section and which may be used 
by an employee in the same manner as: 
(i) annual leave; 
(ii) sick leave; or 
(hi) unused accumulated sick leave after the employee's retirement 
for the purchase of continuing medical and life insurance benefits 
under Sections 67-19-14 2 and 67-19-14.3. 
(2) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rule-
making Act, the director shall make rules for the procedures to implement the 
provisions of Sections 67-19-14 through 67-19-14.3. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-14, e n a c t e d by L. last amended by Laws 1999, ch 64, § 1, regard-
2004, ch. 28, § 1. mg conversion of unused sick leave, and enacts 
Repea l s and Reenactments . — Laws tbe present section, effective May 3, 2004 
2004, ch. 49, § 1 repeals former § 67-19-14, as 
67-19-14.1. Converted sick leave. 
(1) An employee who has 144 hours of accumulated unused sick leave 
immediately prior to the beginning of a calendar year, may elect to convert any 
unused sick leave hours accumulated during that calendar year, in excess of 64 
hours, to converted sick leave. 
(2) The conversion is made at the beginning of the next calendar year. 
(3) Converted sick leave hours are not subject to the reduction provided 
under Subsection 67-19-14.2(4)(a)(h). 
History: C. 1953,67-19-14.1, enacted by L. came effective on May 3, 2004, pursuant to 
2004, ch . 28, § 2. Utah Const , Art VI, Sec 25. 
Effective Dates . — Laws 2004, ch 28 be-
67-19-14.2. Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option Pro-
gram — Creation — Payout at retirement — 
Continuing medical and life insurance benefits 
after retirement. 
(1) (a) There is created the "Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option Pro-
gram." 
(b) An agency may offer the Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option 
Program to an employee who is eligible to receive retirement benefits in 
accordance with Title 49, Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit 
Act. 
(c) An employee's participation in any part of the Unused Sick Leave 
Retirement Option Program is voluntary. 
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(2) The Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option Program provides tha t upon 
ret irement an employee: 
(a) is paid for up to 25% of the employee's unused accumulated sick 
leave at the employee's rate of pay at the time of retirement; 
(b) receives continuing medical and life insurance benefits until the 
employee reaches the age eligible for Medicare or for up to five years, 
which ever occurs sooner; and 
(c) may purchase additional continuing medical and life insurance 
benefits in accordance with Subsection (4). 
(3) An employee may have monies from the pay out under Subsection (2)(a) 
transferred directly to the deferred compensation plan qualified under Section 
401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code which is sponsored by the Utah State 
Retirement Board. 
(4) (a) An employee may purchase continuing medical and life insurance 
benefits, at the rate of one month's coverage per policy for eight hours of 
unused sick leave remaining after: 
(i) the pay out of unused sick leave under Subsection (2)(a); and 
(ii) an additional reduction of 480 hours of unused sick leave. 
(b) The medical coverage level for member, two person, or family 
coverage that is provided to the member at the time of retirement is the 
maximum coverage level available to the member under this program. 
(c) The purchase of continuing medical and life insurance benefits at 
t he ra te provided under Subsection (4)(a) may be used by the employee to 
extend coverage: 
(i) beyond the five years provided under Subsection (2) until the 
employee reaches the age of eligibility for Medicare; or 
(ii) if the employee has reached the age of eligibility for Medicare, 
continuing medical benefits for the employee's spouse may be pur-
chased until the employee's spouse reaches the age of eligibility for 
Medicare. 
(d) An employee and the employee's spouse who are or who later become 
eligible for Medicare may purchase Medicare supplemental insurance at 
t he rate of one month's coverage for eight hours of the employee's unused 
sick leave per person. 
History: C. 1953,67-19-14.2, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 2004, ch 28 be-
2004, c h . 28, § 3. came effective on May 3, 2004, pursuant to 
Federa l Law. — The Internal Revenue Utah Const , Art VI, Sec 25 
Code, cited in Subsection (3), is Title 26 of the 
U S Code. 
67-19-14.3. Continuation of Medical and Dental Insur-
ance Benefits Program — Creation — Coverage 
following death in the line of duty. 
(1) There is created the "Continuation of Medical and Dental Insurance 
Benefits Program" to provide a continuation of medical and dental insurance to 
the surviving spouse and family of any state employee whose death occurs in 
the line of duty. 
(2) The insurance coverage shall continue for a period of five years or until 
the surviving spouse becomes eligible for Medicare, whichever occurs first. 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "K» 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-12-201 (2002) 
49-12-104 UTAH STATE RETIREMENT AND INSURANCE BENEFIT ACT 
History: C. 1953, 49-2-201, enacted by L. 2-201, and substituted the current provisions 
1987, ch. 1, § 34; renumbered by L. 2002, for "There is created for the employees of the 
ch, 250, § 49. state, its educational institutions, and political 
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend- subdivisions the'Public Employees'Retirement 
ment, effective March 26, 2002, renumbered System yn 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 49-
49-12-104. Creation of trust fund. 
(1) There is created the "Public Employees' Contributory Retirement Trust 
Fund" for the purpose of paying the benefits and costs of administering this 
system. 
(2) The fund shall consist of all money paid into it, including interest, in 
accordance with this chapter, whether in the form of cash, securities, or other 
assets, and of all money received from any other source. 
(3) Custody, management, and investment of the fund shall be governed by 
Chapter 11, Utah State Retirement Systems Administration. 
History: C. 1953, 49-2-202, enacted by L. 2-202, added subsection designations, inserted 
1987, ch. 1, § 35; renumbered by L. 2002, "Contributory" m Subsection (1), inserted "in-
ch. 250, § 50. eluding interest" m Subsection (2), and updated 
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend- the code reference m Subsection (3) in light of 
ment, effective March 26, 2002, renumbered the recodification of the Retirement Code by 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 49- this act 
PART 2 
MEMBERSHIP ELIGIBILITY 
49-12-201. System membership — Eligibility. 
(1) A regular full-time employee of a participating employer is eligible for 
service credit in this system upon the later of: 
(a) the date on which the participating employer began participating in 
this system; or 
(b) the effective date of employment of the regular full-time employee 
with the participating employer. 
(2) Beginning July 1, 1986, a person entering employment with the state 
and its educational institutions may not participate in this system. 
History: C. 1953, 49-2-203, enacted by L. ment, effective March 26, 2002, renumbered 
1987, ch. 1, § 36; renumbered by L. 2002, and rewrote this section, which formerly ap-
ch. 250, § 51. peared as § 49-2-203 
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend-
49-12-202. Participation of employers — Limitations — 
Exclusions — Admission requirements — Excep-
tions — Nondiscrimination requirements. 
(1) (a) Unless excluded under Subsection (2), an employer is a participating 
employer and may not withdraw from participation in this system. 
(b) In addition to their participation in this system, participating 
employers may provide or participate in public or private retirement, 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "L" 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-12-401 (2002) 
49-12-302 UTAH STATE RETIREMENT AND INSURANCE BENEFIT ACT 
(3) (a) A participating employer may elect to pay all or part of the required 
member contributions, in addition to the required participating employer 
contributions. 
(b) Any amount contributed by a participating employer under this 
section shall vest to the member's benefit as though the member had made 
the contribution. 
(c) The required member contributions shall be reduced by the amount 
that is paid by the participating employer. 
(4) (a) All member contributions are credited by the office to the account of 
the individual member. 
(b) This amount, together with refund interest, is held in trust for the 
payment of benefits to the member or the member's beneficiaries. 
(c) All member contributions are vested and nonforfeitable. 
(5) (a) Each member is considered to consent to payroll deductions of 
member contributions. 
(b) The payment of compensation less these payroll deductions is 
considered full payment for services rendered by the member. 
History: C. 1953, 49-2-301, enacted by L. and rewrote this section, which formerly ap-
1987, ch. 1, § 40; 1989, ch. 114, § 1; 1990, ch. peared as § 49-2-301 
273, § 9; 1991, ch. 226, § 2; 1992, ch. 157, § 7; Cross-References. — State supported 
renumbered by L. 2002, ch. 250, § 55. minimum school program includes employer 
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend- contributions, § 53A-17a-103 
ment, effective March 26, 2002, renumbered 
49-12-302. Purchase of service credit. 
Any member who works 20 or more hours per week for a participating 
employer participating in this system, but does not meet other eligibility 
requirements for service credit, may purchase the service credit in accordance 
with Section 49-11-403. 
History: C. 1953, 49-12-302, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 2002, ch 250, § 
2002, ch. 250, § 56. 224 makes the act effective on March 26, 2002 
PART 4 
DEFINED BENEFIT 
49-12-401. Eligibility for an allowance — Date of retire-
ment — Qualifications. 
(1) A member is qualified to receive an allowance from this system when: 
(a) the member ceases actual work for a participating employer in this 
system before the member's retirement date and provides evidence of the 
termination; 
(b) the member has submitted to the office a notarized retirement 
application form that states the member's proposed retirement date; and 
(c) one of the following conditions is met as of the member's retirement 
date: 
(i) the member has accrued at least four years of service credit and 
has attained an age of 65 years; 
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(ii) the member has accrued at least ten years of service credit and 
has attained an age of 62 years; 
(iii) the member has accrued at least 20 years of service credit and 
has attained an age of 60 years; or 
(iv) the member has accrued at least 30 years of service credit. 
(2) (a) The member's retirement date shall be the 1st or the 16th day of the 
month, as selected by the member, but the retirement date must be on or 
after the date of termination. 
(b) The retirement date may not be more than 90 days before or after 
the date the application is received by the office. 
History: C. 1953, 49-2-401, enacted by L. (l)(a) substituted "submitting an application 
1987, ch. 1, § 41; 1988, ch. 179, § 8; 1993, ch. form notarized by a notary public" for "applying 
226, § 5; 1996, ch. 231, § 8; 1999, ch. 292, § 4; m writing" and made a stylistic change 
renumbered by L. 2002, ch. 250, § 57. The 2002 amendment, effective March 26, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- 2002, renumbered and rewrote this section, 
ment, effective March 19, 1999, in Subsection which formerly appeared as § 49-2-401 
49-12-402. Service retirement plans — Calculation of re-
tirement allowance — Social Security limita-
tions. 
(1) (a) Except as provided under Section 49-12-701, retirees of this system 
may choose from the six retirement options described in this section. 
(b) Options Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six are modifications of the 
Option One calculation. 
(2) The Option One benefit is an annual allowance calculated as follows: 
(a) If the retiree is at least 65 years of age or has accrued at least 30 
years of service credit, the allowance is: 
(i) an amount equal to 1.25% of the retiree's final average monthly 
salary multiplied by the number of years of service credit accrued 
prior to July 1, 1975; plus 
(ii) an amount equal to 2% of the retiree's final average monthly 
salary multiplied by the number of years of service credit accrued on 
and after July 1, 1975. 
(b) If the retiree is less than 65 years of age, the allowance shall be 
reduced 3% for each year of retirement from age 60 to age 65, unless the 
member has 30 or more years of accrued credit in which event no reduction 
is made to the allowance. 
(c) (i) Years of service includes any fractions of years of service to which 
the retiree may be entitled. 
(ii) At the time of retirement, if a retiree's combined years of actual, 
not purchased, service credit is within Vio of one year of the total years 
of service credit required for retirement, the retiree shall be consid-
ered to have the total years of service credit required for retirement. 
(3) The allowance payable under Options Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six is 
calculated by reducing an Option One benefit based on actuarial computations 
to provide the following: 
(a) Option Two is a reduced allowance paid to and throughout the 
lifetime of the retiree, and, if the retiree receives less in annuity payments 
than the amount of the retiree's member contributions, the remaining 
balance of the retiree's member contributions shall be paid in accordance 
with Sections 49-11-609 and 49-11-610. 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "M» 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-201 (2002) 
49-13-201 UTAH STATE RETIREMENT AND INSURANCE BENEFIT ACT 
History: C. 1953, 49-3-202, enacted by L. this section, which formerly appeared as § 49 
1987, ch. 1, § 62; renumbered by L. 2002, 3 202, added subsection designations, inserted 
ch. 250, § 71. "including interest" m Subsection (2) and up 
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend dated the code reference m Subsection (3) 
ment, effective March 26 2002 renumbered 
PART 2 
MEMBERSHIP ELIGIBILITY 
49-13-201 • System membership — Eligibility. 
(1) Beginning July 1, 1986, the state and its educational institutions shall 
participate in this system 
(a) A person entering regular full-time employment with the state or its 
educational institutions after July 1, 1986, is eligible for service credit in 
this system 
(b) A regular full-time employee of the state or its educational institu-
tions prior to July 1, 1986, may either become eligible for service credit m 
this system or remain eligible for service m the system established under 
Chapter 12, Public Employees' Contributory Retirement Act, by following 
the procedures established by the board in accordance with this chapter 
(2) An employer, other than the state and its educational institutions, may 
participate m this system except that once an employer elects to participate m 
this system, that election is irrevocable 
(a) A person entering regular full-time employment with a participating 
employer which elects to participate in this system is eligible for service 
credit in this system 
(b) A person in regular full-time employment with a participating 
employer prior to the participating employer's election to participate m 
this system may either become eligible for service credit in this system or 
remain eligible for service in the system established under Chapter 12, 
Public Employees' Contributory Retirement Act, by following the proce-
dures established by the board in accordance with this chapter 
History: C. 1953, 49-3-203, enacted by L. ment, effective March 26, 2002, renumbered 
1987, ch. 1, § 63; renumbered by L 2002, and rewrote this section, which formerly ap 
ch. 250, § 72. peared as § 49 3 203 
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicability of section County to work for the state, was a new state 
Former section did not apply only to new employee and could not remain m the contnbu 
employees who had not already been members tory system, but was required to become a 
of the retirement system but to any person member of the noncontnbutory system Horton 
entering full time employment with the state v Utah State Retirement Bd , 842 P2d 928 
Plaintiff, who left a position with Salt Lake (Utah Ct App 1992) 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "N" 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-401 (2002) 
49-13-401 UTAH STATE RETIREMENT AND INSURANCE BENEFIT ACT 
participating employer which has been grandfathered under Section 1116 
of the Federal Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
(b) The member may also make voluntary deferrals to the same 401(k) 
plan which the member selected to receive the employer contribution 
described in Subsection (2)(a). 
(3) Each qualified defined contribution 401(k) plan is separate and distinct 
from any other qualified defined contribution 401(k) plan for all purposes, 
including purposes of fiduciary liability and plan administration. 
(4) A member may not make voluntary deferrals to any other qualified 
401(k) plan sponsored by a state or local government. 
(5) The total amount contributed by the participating employer and the 
member under Subsection (1) or (2) vests to the member's benefit immediately 
and is nonforfeitable. 
(6) The board may request from any other qualified 401(k) plan under 
Subsection (1) or (2) any relevant information pertaining to the maintenance of 
its tax qualification under the Internal Revenue Code. 
(7) The board may take any action which in its judgment is necessary to 
maintain the tax-qualified status of its 401(k) defined contribution plan under 
federal law. 
History: C. 1953, 49-3-302, enacted by L. Federal Law. — Section 401(k) of the Inter-
1987, ch. 1, § 69; 1989, ch. 243, § 1; 1990, ch. nal Revenue Code, referred to throughout this 
273, § 14; 1992, ch. 157, § 15; renumbered section, is 26 U.S.C.S. § 401(k). 
by L. 2002, ch. 250, § 79. Section 1116 of the Federal Tax Reform Act of 
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend- 1936, referred to in Subsection (l)(a), is P.L. 
ment, effective March 26, 2002, renumbered 99.514, § 1116, 100 Stat. 2454-2459, and 
and rewrote this section, which formerly ap- amended 26 U.S.C.S. § 401(k). 
peared as § 49-3-302 
PART 4 
DEFINED BENEFIT 
49-13-401. Eligibility for an allowance — Date of retire-
ment — Qualifications. 
(1) A member is qualified to receive an allowance from this system when: 
(a) the member ceases actual work for a participating employer in this 
system before the member's retirement date and provides evidence of the 
termination; 
(b) the member has submitted to the office a notarized retirement 
application form that states the member's proposed retirement date; and 
(c) one of the following conditions is met as of the member's retirement 
date: 
(i) the member has accrued at least four years of service credit and 
has attained an age of 65 years; 
(ii) the member has accrued at least ten years of service credit and 
has attained an age of 62 years; 
(iii) the member has accrued at least 20 years of service credit and 
has attained an age of 60 years; 
(iv) the member has accrued at least 30 years of service credit; or 
248 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' NONCONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT 49-13-402 
(v) the member has accrued at least 25 years of service credit, in 
which case the member shall be subject to the reduction under 
Subsection 49-13-402(2)(b). 
(2) (a) The member's retirement date shall be the 1st or the 16th day of the 
month, as selected by the member, but the retirement date must be on or 
after the date of termination. 
(b) The retirement date may not be more than 90 days before or after 
the date the application is received by the office. 
History: C. 1953, 49-3-401, enacted by L. (l)(a) substituted "submitting an application 
1987, ch. 1, § 70; 1988, ch. 179, § 13; 1993, form notarized by a notary public" for "applying 
ch. 226, § 8,1994, ch. 317, § 1; 1995, ch. 197, in writing" and made a stylistic change. 
§ 11; 1996, ch. 231, §§ 11, 12; 1999, ch. 292, The 2002 amendment, effective March 26, 
§ 6; renumbered by L. 2002, ch. 250, § 80. 2002, renumbered and rewrote this section, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- which formerly appeared as § 49-3-401. 
ment, effective March 19, 1999, in Subsection 
49-13-402. Service retirement plans — Calculation of re-
tirement allowance — Social Security limita-
tions. 
(1) (a) Except as provided under Section 49-13-701, retirees of this system 
may choose from the six retirement options described in this section. 
(b) Options Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six are modifications of the 
Option One calculation. 
(2) The Option One benefit is an allowance calculated as follows: 
(a) If the retiree is at least 65 years of age or has accrued at least 30 
years of service credit, the allowance is an amount equal to 2% of the 
retiree's final average monthly salary multiplied by the number of years of 
service credit accrued. 
(b) If the retiree is less than 65 years of age, the allowance shall be 
reduced 3% for each year of retirement from age 60 to age 65, plus a full 
actuarial reduction for each year of retirement prior to age 60, unless the 
member has 30 or more years of accrued credit, in which event no 
reduction is made to the allowance. 
(c) (i) Years of service include any fractions of years of service to which 
the retiree may be entitled. 
(ii) At the time of retirement, if a retiree's combined years of actual, 
not purchased, service credit is within Vio of one year of the total years 
of service credit required for retirement, the retiree shall be consid-
ered to have the total years of service credit required for retirement. 
(3) The allowance payable under Options Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six is 
calculated by reducing an Option One benefit based on actuarial computations 
to provide the following: 
(a) Option Two is a reduced allowance paid to and throughout the 
lifetime of the retiree, and, if the retiree receives less in annuity payments 
than the amount of the retiree's member contributions, the remaining 
balance of the retiree's member contributions shall be paid in accordance 
with Sections 49-11-609 and 49-11-610. 
(b) Option Three is a reduced allowance paid to and throughout the 
lifetime of the retiree, and, upon the death of the retiree, the same reduced 
allowance paid to and throughout the lifetime of the retiree's lawful spouse 
at the time of retirement. 
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